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This thesis reports four studies in the context of virtual reality (VR), feelings of presence, 
emotion, and perception. Previous research established the existence of cross-dimensional 
perceptual interrelations such as the interconnection between experienced motion and subjective 
time. This is thought to result from a common perceptual system. However, the specifics of this 
system are a matter of ongoing research. An important binding factor between perceptual 
dimensions is the bodily self, which was described as a reference for perception. In Study I, 
manipulations of the size of a virtual self-representation were shown to affect the spatial 
judgment of objects. In Study II, the degree of self-motion in an immersive virtual environment 
(IVE) influenced the subjective perception of time, corroborating previous findings about the 
common perceptual system. Besides the virtual self-representation, there is another important 
variable in VR experiments: Presence is described as the feeling of being in a mediated 
environment. Presence was not associated with improved performance in the spatial and 
temporal judgments of Studies I and II. However, in Study III, presence in a gaming activity was 
linked to improved mood after an experimental stress-induction. This especially applied to VR 
gaming, where impressions about the subjective realism of the IVE might have been crucial for 
mood repair. As outlined in Study IV, it is important to distinguish between presence as an 
attentional allocation to the mediated world and as an individual judgment about its realism. 
Taken together, the results from all studies corroborate the idea of the self as a fundamental 
perceptual reference, confirm results about the psychological connection between space and 
time, emphasize the benefits of VR gaming in improving mood, and elucidate the role of 
perceived realism in assessing presence in IVEs.  
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1. Introduction and Overview 
 
Albert Einstein established that space and time are interconnected and that the perception of both 
is depending on the motion of the observer (Einstein, 1905). Whereas physics is relevant at 
velocities close to the speed of light, psychology is concerned with the connection of space and 
time in everyday perception. In this thesis, I will show that different domains of perception, such 
as time and space, are closely interrelated and that they depend on the own body as a system of 
reference. The body does not just act as a spatial cue for the perception of external space, our self 
and its ascribed properties fundamentally change our cognitions about the world. My work is 
based on experiments involving virtual reality (VR) technology. Thus, I will also explain why 
VR is a promising tool for conducting experiments involving time and space perception and 
discuss the shortcomings of current measurements of presence – the feeling of being in a 
mediated world such as an immersive virtual environment (IVE; cf. Steuer, 1992). Presence not 
only affects how our attention is captured by the VR system, but also how compelling and 
visually appealing the system appears to users. Presence also plays an important role in the 
regulation of emotions in IVEs and supports recovery from negative mood states. 
In the first study of this thesis, I conducted an experiment with virtual body representations of 
the self (i.e. avatars). In an IVE, Participants slipped into a human avatar that was manipulated to 
be either unnaturally tall or short, or of normal size. The premise of the experiment was to 
investigate whether the size of one’s own body – surely one of the most visible properties of the 
self – would change the way objects presented to the participants in the IVE would be perceived 
in terms of size. The experiment also varied the method by which a feeling of ownership over the 
avatar was created and whether the body was enabled to act as a visual reference or not. 
In the second study of this thesis, another property of the self, self-motion, was the object of 
investigation. In this experiment, participants experienced a virtual car ride at different speeds 
and for different durations. Here, I studied the influence of self-motion velocity on the subjective 
perception of time. As in the first study, presence was included as a covariate because it could 
influence the way the IVE is experienced by participants. 
In addition to the inclusion of presence in the two described works, presence was also the central 
construct in the third and fourth manuscript of this thesis: In an empirical study, presence was 
expected to enhance mood repair after an episode of stress. After a stress induction, participants 
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played a computer game with or without using a head-mounted display (HMD) or watched a 
video recording of someone else playing the game. I was interested in how immersion and 
individually experienced presence would influence the overall state of mood. This study was 
originally based on the experiment of my Master’s thesis and involved additional recruitments of 
participants, a new experimental structure as well as a substantially different statistical approach 
for data analysis. 
Lastly, in an opinion article, which is the fourth work of this thesis, I summarized my 
observations of using presence as a covariate in experiments. The main goal of this article was to 
show how presence in an IVE is different from presence in other media and how important it is 
to include judgments about the perceived realism of the virtual world in presence questionnaires. 
My thesis is an addition to the existing work on the perception of time, space, and emotion and 
demonstrates how strongly our own body and our self-motion are interconnected with the 
perceptual evaluation of the world. Furthermore, my work provides an example for an effective 
yet resource-efficient use of VR for conducting empirical research – especially in the domain of 
temporal, spatial and emotional perception and cognition. In the following, I will describe the 
four manuscripts in this thesis in larger depth and connect them with existing empirical work and 
theoretical concepts in the literature.  
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2. Space and Time Perception and the Influence of the Body 
 
2.1 Theoretical Background 
In experimental exercises during my Bachelor’s studies, I contributed to an experiment about 
time-space synesthesia. This form of synesthesia is characterized by strong spatial associations 
of time concepts in the mind and is estimated to appear in as much as a fifth of the population 
(Mann, Korzenko, Carriere, & Dixon, 2009; Sagiv, Simner, Collins, Butterworth, & Ward, 2006; 
first described by Galton, 1880). A typical spatial association is imagining the months of the year 
in a circle (Mann et al., 2009). But not only synesthetes associate time with space, there are 
many time-space metaphors in common language: "a long day", "time flows", or "move a 
meeting forward" (Boroditsky, 2000; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). These associations are found 
among different cultures (Alverson, 1994). Apart from language, we also use spatial aids like 
calendars and clocks to visualize time. 
Empirical studies demonstrated that these two forms of perception are indeed connected: In early 
work by Benussi (1913), the time interval between three successively illuminated stimuli 
affected the perceived physical distance of the stimuli. This was called the Tau effect (Helson, 
1930). In subsequent studies, the effect was replicated (Geldreich, 1934; Lechelt & Borcher, 
1977), extended to tactile (Helson & King, 1931) and auditory stimuli (Scholz, 1924), and shown 
to be invertible (Cohen, Hansel, & Sylvester, 1953; Collyer, 1977). The latter was termed the 
Kappa effect (physical distance affects subjective duration; Cohen et al., 1953). Even though 
alternative explanations for these effects were suggested (i.e. imputation of uniform motion to 
discontinuous displays; Jones & Huang, 1982), more recent research has confirmed that space 
and time perception are intertwined. In a series of experiments by Casasanto and Boroditsky 
(2008), the length of lines presented on a computer screen affected their subjective presentation 
duration. Further studies showed that subjective time is represented on a (spatial) mental time 
line (e.g. Conson, Cinque, Barbarulo, & Trojano, 2008; Ishihara, Keller, Rossetti, & Prinz, 2008; 
an overview is provided by Bonato, Zorzi, & Umiltà, 2012) and that the processing of time is at 
least partially connected to activity in brain areas otherwise associated with space perception 
(e.g. Bueti, Bahrami, & Walsh, 2008; Oliveri et al., 2009). 
Not only are space and time perception connected, but also many other associations between 
different domains of perception have been discovered (e.g. Marks, 1987; Marks, Szczesiul, & 
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Ohlott, 1986; Ward, Huckstep, & Tsakanikos, 2006). Particularly, there seems to be a common 
system of magnitude, whereby subjective judgments about the magnitude of such domains as 
time, numerosity, size, and luminance of stimuli as well as the perception of digits are all 
interrelated (e.g. Xuan Zhang, He, & Chen, 2007; for an overview see Cantlon, Platt, & Brannon, 
2009). This led to the formulation of A Theory of Magnitude (ATOM) by Walsh (2003). The 
theory assumes that there is a common system for magnitude processing which is acquired in 
early development stages by learning the associations of perceptual dimensions while planning 
and performing actions (Bueti & Walsh, 2009). Semantic pairs like "more and less", "far and 
near", "big and small", and "fast and slow" are thought to depend on a general sense of 
magnitude (Bueti & Walsh, 2009). However, challenges to the model have been proposed, 
including findings that showed that different domains of perception are not symmetrically 
related. In the experiments by Casasanto and Boroditsky (2008), for example, only the length of 
the line affected its perceived duration and the actual presentation time did not affect the 
perceived length of the line. One possibility to reconcile these findings with the suggested cross-
dimensional interferences in perception is to assume that our sense of space is the dominant 
perceptual system, which affects all other sensory domains. Bonato et al. (2012, p. 2267) have 
argued that "space might be the common metric for representing abstract, non-spatial entities, 
such as time". The idea is supported by cortical networks that share activation in spatial tasks and 
basic sensorimotor transformations (Bueti, Walsh, Frith, & Rees, 2008). 
An important spatial cue in perception is the bodily self. The brain needs to constantly adjust its 
interpretation of sensory input to the current position of the eyes, the head, and the body. Thus, it 
is not surprising that our judgments about the size of objects and distances depend on our 
perceived eye height, which in turn is determined by visual cues but also proprioceptive and 
vestibular information (Leyrer, Linkenauger, Bülthoff, & Mohler, 2015). Similarly, perceived 
distance is affected by the orientation of the body (Harris & Mander, 2014) or by the 
gravitational force acting on the body (Clement, Loureiro, Sousa, & Zandvliet, 2016). Moreover, 
it was shown that the perception of audio frequencies is connected to the body’s orientation and 
the egocentric definition of "up" and "down" (higher frequencies were associated with the 
perceptual upright in a visual decision task; Carnevale & Harris, 2013). Perceived body size was 
also shown to affect tactile perception (cf. D'Amour, Pritchett, & Harris, 2015; de Vignemont, 
Ehrsson, & Haggard, 2005). In the Weber Illusion, the perceived size of a felt object depends on 
 12 
the body part on which the object is held against, depending on its density of tactile receptors 
(Longo & Haggard, 2011; Weber, 1834). Taken together, there is strong empirical evidence for a 
coupling of sensory information and body representation. Sensory signals are processed with 
reference to the body's shape, proportion, and movement (Harris et al., 2015). Consequently, 
Harris et al. (2015, p. 4) describe the body as a "universal reference system of the brain". Other 
authors refer to the body as "the fundamental ruler" (van der Hoort & Ehrsson, 2016, p. 1) or the 
"system of axes of coordinates" (translated from French: "système d’axes de coordonnées"; 
Poincaré, 1952, p. 100). The importance of the body in cognition has also been recognized in 
philosophy and psychological research under the term embodied cognition. Embodied cognition 
entails that cognition is fundamentally affected by the body (overviews are provided by Shapiro, 
2019, and Wilson & Foglia, 2011). Serving as a reference system, the body presumably provides 
connections between different perceptual domains and is a possible source for the proposed 
common spatial metric of perception. Spatial concepts might be primarily learned through the 
interaction of the self with the world, which means that the body shapes and defines our concept 
of space (cf. Smith & Gasser, 2005; Thelen, 1995). 
The body does, however, not only affect basic perception: In VR studies, identity cues of virtual 
body representations were shown to affect behavior and cognition (an overview is provided by 
Ratan, Beyea, Li, & Graciano, 2019). This means that participants' behavior and attitudes adapt 
to their avatar's characteristics, a phenomenon that was termed Proteus effect (Yee & Bailenson, 
2007). To illustrate the concept, virtual body height was found to be positively connected to a 
more aggressive negotiation style (Yee & Bailenson, 2007; Yee, Bailenson, & Ducheneaut, 
2009) and performance in a competitive online game (Yee, Bailenson, & Ducheneaut, 2009). 
The Proteus effect demonstrates how behavior, thoughts, and beliefs are shaped by involuntary 
cognitive associations between the observed body representations in VR and their ascribed 
characteristics. As such, the Proteus effect is a primary example of embodied cognition and the 
close relationship between the body and the perception of the world. It is, however, still debated 
whether the Proteus effect primarily results from self-perception or schema activation (Ratan et 
al., 2019). It has been argued that closeness to the avatar (in terms of physical distance as well as 
similarity and identification) enhances the Proteus effect and that this demonstrates an interplay 
between self-perception and schema activation (Ratan & Dawson, 2016; Ratan & Sah, 2015). 
However, so far there is not much empirical evidence for this claim. 
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To address this concern and to investigate how the body affects our perception of space and time, 
two experimental studies were conducted, which serve as Manuscripts I and II of this thesis. 
Specifically, the study described in Manuscript I tested the assumption that changing the size of a 
virtual self-representation influences the perception of space. In the study described in 
Manuscript II, self-motion in VR was the determinant in question for space and time perception. 
Here, more specifically, the relation of space and time perception was investigated. In the 
remaining sections of Chapter 2, I describe the starting points, empirical implementations, and 
findings of the two experiments and explain the implications for research and everyday life. 
 
2.2 Body Size and the Perception of Objects 
In a series of experiments by Björn van der Hoort and colleagues, propositions of embodied 
cognition and the Proteus effect were empirically tested (van der Hoort, Guterstam, & Ehrsson, 
2011; van der Hoort & Ehrsson, 2014; 2016). To find out whether the overall size of the 
"fundamental ruler" (van der Hoort & Ehrsson, 2016, p. 1) changes the perception of the size of 
objects, dolls in various sizes were used. A stereoscopic set of cameras captured the lower part of 
the doll, essentially creating a first-person view of the doll’s body. This footage was transmitted 
in real-time to an HMD, to give a participant the impression of looking down one's own body. To 
create a strong illusionary association between the self and the artificial body, both the 
participant and the doll were synchronously touched by a rod. Synchronous stroking is a 
commonly used method for inducing body ownership – the feeling that the touched artificial 
body is one’s own (cf. de Vignemont, 2011; the term was originally derived from research on the 
rubber-hand illusion, see Botvinick & Cohen, 1998, and Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). Inducing 
ownership of a full body is also referred to as the full-body-illusion (Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008). 
The full-body-illusion is the consequence of the brain's attempt to reconcile the spatial and 
temporal correlations of visual and somatic signals (Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008). 
The results of all three experiments showed that the perceived size of objects was influenced by 
the size of one's body. Object sizes were overestimated when embodying a small body but 
underestimated when embodying a large body. Such an effect of regressing one’s judgments 
towards midsize magnitudes is referred to as contraction bias in research on perception (Poulton, 
1989). The contraction bias itself is not a surprising finding but van der Hoort et al. (2011) 
showed that the size of this bias was depending on the ownership condition: Synchronous as 
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compared to asynchronous touch led to an increased contraction bias. This was coined the own-
body-size effect. The effect was replicated in two successive studies (van der Hoort & Ehrsson, 
2014; 2016), where it could furthermore be demonstrated that the effect is not an effect of mere 
visual comparison (the artificial body was occluded during the visual judgment of the objects' 
sizes). 
There were no other direct replications of the effect. In VR, a study showed that varying the size 
of a participant's virtual hand led to a contraction bias when judging the size of balls presented 
next to the participant's hand on a table (Linkenauger, Leyrer, Bülthoff, & Mohler, 2013). The 
experiment included a control condition where the size of the hand of an avatar standing on the 
opposite side of the table was manipulated. Interestingly, there was no contraction bias in this 
control condition. Unfortunately, the experiment did not include subjective measures of 
ownership, meaning that it is not clear whether this was an effect of ownership or mere 
perspective. Another study used full-body tracking to create mappings of body movements onto 
an avatar (Banakou, Groten, & Slater, 2013). This created a full-body-illusion of being small 
compared to another avatar that was placed in the room. The mappings could be synchronous or 
asynchronous, thus offering an alternative manipulation of ownership. In this study, objects were 
generally overestimated compared to a control condition without a visible body, suggesting that 
the feeling of being small led to an overestimation of objects. When the mappings of the 
participants' movements were asynchronous, no such difference could be observed, suggesting 
that ownership is responsible for the effect. However, it is unclear how the advantage of having a 
body in an IVE could have contributed to these findings (cf. Ries, Interrante, Kaeding, & 
Anderson, 2008; Mohler, Creem-Regehr, Thompson, & Bülthoff, 2010). Both VR studies show 
important deviations from the original paradigm and do either not systematically vary the size of 
the whole body or do not maintain the same perspective in all conditions. Thus, it is still unclear 
whether the own-body-size effect as reported by van der Hoort et al. (2011) also applies to a VR 
setting, using virtual avatars instead of real-life dolls. 
In essence, there are two important shortcomings of the own-body-size effect: 1) that the effect 
was never replicated outside the original lab using the same paradigm and 2) that the effect was 
never convincingly demonstrated in VR. It is important to test whether the effect also applies to 
VR not only to strengthen the evidence that the body acts as a fundamental ruler in perception, 
but also because it is vital to obtain the same results in VR as in setups using real-life props such 
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as dolls. VR is a promising tool for conducting research that is economical, easy to adapt, 
ecologically valid, and allows a strict control of environmental variables (cf. Bohil, Alicea, & 
Biocca, 2011; Parsons, Gaggioli, & Riva, 2017; see also Chapter 3.1 of this thesis). VR is also 
used in practical applications such as training for pilots and surgeons (Colt, Crawford, & 
Galbraith, 2001; Khalifa, Bogorad, Gibson, Peifer, & Nussbaum, 2006). As such, it is important 
to know the effects of manipulating the body in VR on the perception of virtual objects and 
scenes. In order to design realistic IVEs that trigger the desired training effects on perception and 
motoric performance, one needs to know if and how VR differs from reality. 
In my first study (Weber, Mast, & Weibel, 2019; Manuscript I in the appendix), my colleagues 
and I tackled these issues by implementing the paradigm used by van der Hoort et al. (2011) in a 
VR setting. We used virtual bodies instead of dolls and the IVE consisted of the laboratory room 
that was reconstructed in VR to give the impression that one is at the same physical space. In this 
IVE, participants embodied either very small, medium-sized, or extremely tall avatars. The 
participants judged the size of box-shaped objects in the virtual laboratory room. As expected, 
we could observe a contraction bias: underestimation of object sizes in the large avatar and 
overestimation in the small avatar. However, importantly, the magnitude of the contraction effect 
did not vary between synchronous and asynchronous touch conditions. Thus, we could not 
replicate the own-body-size effect, even though questionnaires showed that the manipulation of 
ownership had worked. We decided to implement a second experiment, where we did not only 
vary the synchronicity of touch, but also the perspective of the participant, having either the 
usual first-person perspective (1PP) of the avatar or shifting the avatar to the right to obtain a 
third-person perspective (3PP). This combined manipulation of touch sensations and perspective 
was intended to enhance the differences between the ownership conditions, as studies have 
shown that a 3PP is a powerful tool for disrupting ownership sensations (Maselli & Slater, 2014; 
Petkova, Björnsdotter, Gentile, Jonsson, & Ehrsson, 2011). The results from the questionnaires 
confirmed that the difference between the ownership conditions increased. As in the first 
experiment, the experienced presence in the IVE was increased in the high ownership condition 
compared to the low ownership condition, suggesting that the feeling of high body ownership 
and presence were related. Nevertheless, the manipulation of ownership did not lead to a 
differential effect on size judgments (own-body-size effect). Finally, to rule out the possibility of 
using the avatar as a size cue for judging the objects, we conducted a third experiment similar to 
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that of van der Hoort & Ehrsson (2014; 2016), where we removed the virtual body during size 
judgments. Also, in this third experiment, we could demonstrate a contraction bias, but not the 
proposed own-body-size effect of van der Hoort et al. (2011) and van der Hoort & Ehrsson 
(2014; 2016). 
In an exploratory follow-up experiment, I also implemented a full-body tracking using the Xbox 
Kinect sensor (Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, United States). Participants were standing 
upright in a virtual market square controlling a virtual body with their own movements. The 
body was either extremely tall (as tall as the surrounding buildings) or extremely small (same 
size as a drink can shown on the floor; see Figure 1). Again, the size of box-shaped objects had 
to be judged. A contraction bias could be observed, but there was again no impact of an 
ownership manipulation (synchronous or asynchronous mappings of body movements; see 
Figure 2). Possibly, however, the perspective cue in this experiment was too strong and obscured 
any ownership effects. 
Taken together, even though the virtual body apparently interfered with the participants' 
perception of space (a contraction bias was obtained in all experiments), I could not confirm the 
proposition that ownership would enhance the impact of the ascribed characteristics of the body 
on visual perception. These findings are discussed in Section 2.4. 
 
 
Figure 1. Small body condition (left) and large body condition (right) in the pilot experiment. 
Please note that, in the IVE, the virtual body would be facing forward 
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Figure 2. Size estimation as a function of body size (F(1, 54) = 34.35, p < .001) and 
synchronicity of mappings (F(1, 54) = 0.01, p = .921) 
 
2.3 Self-Motion and Time Perception 
In my next study, I extended the research on the own body in the sense of self-motion 
influencing space and time perception. Surprisingly, even though findings about the 
interrelatedness of space and time are numerous and both concepts are regarded as 
fundamentally intertwined in modern concepts of physics (see Sections 1 and 2.1), there is only 
scarce empirical evidence of a psychological influence of spatial self-displacement on time 
perception. Fast motion of simple geometrical stimuli was found to be linked to an increased 
subjective perception of their duration (Bonnet, 1965; Brown, 1995). The effect was 
approximately linear and could be replicated several times using different experimental designs 
(Au, Ono, & Watanabe, 2012; Bruno, Ayhan, & Johnston, 2012; Gorea, & Kim, 2015; 
Tomassini, Gori, Burr, Sandini, & Morrone, 2011). 
However, only few studies extended the effect to the observer's own motion, changing the 
displacement of the entire visual field. In studies using a rotating device to induce passive self-
motion, the rate of tapping on a button increased in trials with accelerated rotation (Binetti, 
Siegler, Bueti, & Doricchi, 2010; Capelli, Deborne, & Israël, 2007). Participants were instructed 
to press the button in a regular interval. In a similar study, accelerated rotation was associated 
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with a temporally accelerated tone sequence (Binetti, Siegler, Bueti, & Doricchi, 2013). In these 
experiments, self-motion velocity was confounded with the rate of acceleration because of 
physical constraints (to achieve a certain speed, the participant needs to be accelerated, resulting 
either in different average or top speeds). Importantly, the participants were blindfolded during 
the task. Thus, the found effects do not indicate an effect of the visually perceived motion of 
surroundings. Instead, vestibular perception supposedly elicited the effect (cf. Capelli et al., 
2007). However, unlike the visual perceptual system, the vestibular system of humans is 
arguably only able to detect changes in velocity, not constant speed (cf. Goldberg & Fernandez, 
1984). 
Apart from studies using blind rotation, there were two studies using self-motion during car 
rides. In a study by Brehmer (1970), participants were seated in a car driving on a highway. They 
had to produce time intervals that were a multiple the length of a previously experienced 
reference duration (magnitude production paradigm). The produced durations were longer in a 
higher speed condition. In a study by van Rijn (2014), participants were shown movie clips of 
virtual cars moving along a virtual road with varying velocities on a computer screen. Durations 
had to be judged to be either shorter or longer than a previously experienced reference duration, 
and the proportion of "longer" responses increased with increasing speed, independent from the 
actual duration (magnitude comparison paradigm). Both studies using car motion had 
disadvantages. In Brehmer's (1970) study, there was little control over the changing surroundings 
of the car and the conditions were possibly confounded with the amount of distraction associated 
with the car's speed on the highway. Additionally, the magnitude production paradigm is 
problematic because it has been argued that giving accurate perceptual estimations on a ratio 
scale is very difficult (Narens, 1996; see also Ellermeier & Faulhammer, 2000, and Zimmer, 
2005). Similarly, the magnitude comparison paradigm used in van Rijn's study (2014) provides 
only an indirect measure of subjective time and the used time intervals were in a very small 
range of 2500 ms +/- 200 ms. It has been argued in the literature that effects of subjective time 
are heavily influenced by the measurement paradigm, often revealing conflicting results between 
different measures (Matthews, & Meck, 2014). Furthermore, it has been discussed whether the 
use of a reproduction paradigm provides a direct and intuitive measure for assessing subjective 
time (Zakay, 1990). In a reproduction paradigm, a previously experienced target duration is 
reproduced by the participant, usually by pressing a button (Grondin, 2008; Zakay, 1990). 
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Rammsayer and Verner (2014) have argued that a reproduction paradigm shows less intersubject 
variability than production paradigms and provides a more direct measure of subjective time. 
Reproduction could potentially lead to different results than studies using production paradigms. 
Therefore, my colleagues and I applied measures of reproduction to study the effect of visually 
perceived self-motion on time and distance perception (Weber, Weibel, & Mast, 2020a; 
Manuscript II in the appendix). In the experiment, participants wore an HMD. The IVE consisted 
of a straight virtual road leading through a city environment. Participants were passively driven 
along the road for different durations and varying speeds. The use of VR allowed for the 
application of constant virtual self-motion without the need for acceleration. Additionally, 
through the use of VR, we could effectively emulate a realistic car drive and still maintain a high 
control over the surroundings. As a consequence, the amount of attention required by the task 
was the same in each condition. Controlling for attention is very important because time 
perception is very context-dependent (Matthews & Meck, 2014). For example, a few studies 
have shown that fast stimulus motion is not necessarily associated with longer subjective 
presentation time (Darlow, Dylman, Gheorghiu, & Matthews, 2013; Nyman, Karlsson, & 
Antfolk, 2017). These differences can be explained by characteristics of the task and the stimuli 
that were used (the amount of required attention, how attention is allocated, but also the 
complexity of the stimuli and whether memory is involved; see Eagleman, 2008, for an 
overview). In our experiment, the use of VR allowed for highly standardized conditions, only 
varying in trial duration, self-motion velocity and traveled distance. Additionally, with the use of 
a prospective timing paradigm (participants know in advance that they will have to judge the 
duration), the level of memory involved in the timing task is lower than in a retrospective 
paradigm (participants are unexpectedly asked to judge the duration after the task; cf. Block, 
1974; Block & Zakay, 1997). 
The results of the experiment showed that a higher speed of the car was associated with longer 
subjective time as indicated by longer reproductions. However, the effect showed important 
deviations from linearity, suggesting that the effect of speed shrinks in the highest speed 
conditions. Moreover, whereas time intervals and the velocity of the condition were consistently 
underestimated by the participants, the traveled distance was overestimated. This suggests that 
the different domains of perception were not consistent with each other (having a lower velocity 
and requiring less time should result in traveling a lower distance). Another finding concerned 
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experienced presence during the task, measured using questionnaires. Even though higher 
presence is usually associated with improved performance in perceptual tasks in IVEs (e.g. 
reduced underestimation of space; see Renner, Velichkovsky, & Helmert, 2013) and presence 
boosts task performance in skills training (Azar, 1996; Regian, Shebilske, & Monk, 1992), we 
could not find any relation between the accuracy of time judgments and reported presence, nor 
an effect of presence on self-reported confidence in the timing task. Thus, the interdependence 
between perceived space and time in the IVE was not affected by presence, although presence is 
usually associated with attentional allocation to the IVE (see Sections 3.1 and 3.3). The results of 
this study are further discussed in the next section. 
 
2.4 Discussion 
In two studies (Weber et al., 2019 and Weber, Weibel, & Mast, 2020a), together with my 
colleagues, I studied the influence of the body on time and space judgments. The observer – to 
use Einstein’s term – was either manipulated in terms of its overall size or the speed of self-
motion. I was able to demonstrate that both aspects of the observer interfered with the basic 
perception of objects’ size, the subjective experience of time, and perceived distance. In the first 
study (Weber et al., 2019), the overall size of a virtual body influenced the perception of objects' 
size in an IVE, which corroborates previous findings (Banakou et al., 2013; Linkenauger et al., 
2013; van der Hoort et al., 2011). The results also hint at a possible common perceptual system, 
combining spatial self-perception of the body with the relative size of external objects. There is 
cognitive influence from the characteristics of the body on perception in the sense of a Proteus 
effect. This influence is possibly able to affect behavior in certain situations (e.g. choosing a 
smaller object with a small avatar because the object appears bigger). Because hiding the body 
during the judgment phase did not result in changes in size judgments, it seems likely that 
schema activation contributed to the Proteus effect. The role of self-perception, however, 
remains unclear. We could not confirm the claim that closeness to the avatar enhanced the 
Proteus effect and, thus, that the Proteus effect would rely on self-perception in combination with 
schema activation (cf. Ratan & Dawson, 2016). 
Our results also challenge previous conceptions that the subjective ownership toward the avatar 
would interfere with the extent of the contraction bias (van der Hoort et al., 2011; van der Hoort 
& Ehrsson, 2014; 2016). We were not able to replicate the own-body-size effect. The implication 
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of these findings is that perception is depending on the body as a reference system, but the effect 
is not self-referential, meaning that the body needs not be thought of as one's own body, as 
suggested by the lack of influence of ownership. Even bodies not touched synchronously and 
lying in a 3PP evoked the contraction bias, despite them showing markedly reduced ratings of 
ownership. Thereby, our results show that manipulating the perspective in VR is a promising tool 
for disrupting self-reported ownership. However, future VR embodiment studies will have to pay 
attention to the disownership conditions as they may not result in the same effect as in 
conventional embodiment studies. In this regard, it would be interesting to test the bounding 
factors of how far off from a 1PP and how dissimilar to ourselves an avatar can be, while still 
influencing our perception. Another possible future experiment could replace the bodies in our 
experiment with non-body-like objects to decide whether the body is especially relevant for 
perception or if any object presented to the near-personal space affects the perception of objects 
in far-external space. 
A main conclusion from our experiment is that the full-body-illusion in VR potentially works 
differently than in classical experiments. It may be that perception in VR is effectively different 
from perception in real life and sensory signals are not processed in the same way. At least, 
research since the early days of VR has consistently shown that space is being perceived as 
compressed in IVEs (cf. Renner et al., 2013). This effect was initially explained in terms of 
technical properties of the HMDs such as a reduced field-of-view and an increased weight, but 
could not be fully eliminated when using devices that were enhanced accordingly (e.g. Kelly, 
Cherep, & Siegel, 2017; Willemsen, Colton, Creem-Regehr, & Thompson, 2004). Possibly, 
virtual objects do not simply inherit the properties of their real-life counterparts and are judged 
differently in VR. However, there are many possible alternative explanations including that even 
very low ownership towards the avatar in our study could have still led to a strong perceptual 
influence on perceived objects' size. The virtual body could still have acted as a self-referential 
cue, even when presented in a 3PP and it is also possible that the body served as a visual 
reference drawn from memory (cf. van der Hoort & Ehrsson, 2016). Present experimental setups 
(Weber et al., 2019; van der Hoort et al., 2011) are not able to rule out these alternative 
explanations and, thus, future studies using other paradigms will be needed. 
The results from the second study (Weber, Weibel, & Mast, 2020a) showed that conditions with 
higher velocity led to longer subjective time judgments, demonstrating an effect of spatio-visual 
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cues on time perception and confirming previous experiments with moving stimuli (e.g. Brown, 
1995; Tomassini et al., 2011). There was a monotonic increase in judged time with each increase 
in velocity, but we could not replicate the linear trend reported by Brown (1995). Possibly, in 
more complex situations like driving in a car, subjective time is no longer linearly associated 
with motion. In the driving simulation experiment by van Rijn (2014), for example, the effect of 
speed also decreased in very high-velocity conditions. 
The findings can be explained by time perception theories. The Internal clock model (Treisman, 
1963; cf. Grondin, 2010) postulates that nerve impulses are generated in regular intervals and the 
onset of a stimulus activates an accumulator that keeps track of the elicited pulses. In terms of 
this model, fast self-motion could lead to more impulses by speeding up the impulse generation 
process (cf. Brown, 2008). Alternative models postulating a State-dependent-network offer 
similar effect mechanisms. These models assume that time intervals are judged using changes in 
neural activation patterns (cf. Eagleman, 2008; Grondin, 2010). Higher speed and, thus, an 
increased change of visual input could lead to stronger changes in activation patterns. There are 
also newer models which assume that the visual input is directly linked to the rate of change in 
activation patterns (Perceptually-driven-network; Roseboom, Fountas, Nikiforou, Bhowmik, 
Shanahan, & Seth, 2019). All explanations have in common that time is heavily influenced by 
the perception of space. Indeed, a series of experiments by Casasanto & Boroditsky (2008) has 
shown that the subjective duration of a stimulus depends on its spatial properties. Interestingly, 
the opposite effect might not exist or be weaker: In the same study, the duration did not affect the 
perception of spatial properties. The authors noted that there are also numerous spatial concepts 
to express time in language, but not many temporal metaphors for expressing spatial concepts 
(with notable exceptions such as a place being "a one-hour drive" away). Consequently, it has 
been proposed that intermodal perceptual relations are not as consistent and as symmetric as the 
ATOM theory suggests (Walsh, 2003). ATOM assumes a common magnitude system that is 
acquired or strengthened through experience from actions (e.g. catching a ball or jumping in a 
pool). It suggests that higher magnitudes in one perceptual domain are connected to higher 
magnitudes in other domains and vice versa. However, because studies have challenged this 
proposition (Cai & Connell, 2015; Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008; Riemer, Shine, & Wolbers, 
2018), alternative models have been suggested that allow for asymmetrical intermodal relations. 
The Asymmetry hypothesis assumes that one domain can predominantly influence another 
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domain, depending on the situation (Loeffler, Cañal-Bruland, Schroeger, Tolentino-Castro, & 
Raab, 2018). For example, studies have demonstrated that the processing of auditory information 
shows enhanced sensitivity to temporal information but lower sensitivity to spatial information, 
whereas the reverse is true for visual information processing (O'Connor & Hermelin, 1972; 
Recanzone, 2009; see Loeffler et al., 2018). Possibly, people rely on the modality with the 
highest informational value and, often, this modality is vision (cf. Loeffler et al., 2018). If asked 
to judge an abstract modality such as time, people strongly rely on concrete visual-spatial cues 
because they offer the highest informational value. A Bayesian framework for a common 
magnitude system has recently been proposed (Martin, Wiener, & van Wassenhove, 2017). In 
this framework, the differing dimensional weights are conceptualized with multiple perceptual 
priors. 
My results support the view that cross-modal perceptual relations are not necessarily 
symmetrical. Over all conditions, time intervals were slightly underestimated and driving speed 
was also underestimated. According to physics, lower speed and less time result in less covered 
distance. However, the participants in our experiment overestimated distances. Thus, 
participants' responses were not consistent with physics. This means that the cross-dimensional 
relations in our experiment were not caused by a strictly symmetrical system of magnitude but 
rather showing asymmetrical cross-modal interrelations. The visual system might have 
influenced the judgments of distance, speed, and time differently, according to the relative 
importance of visual cues. In terms of a Bayesian model, this would mean that different priors 
were set to the sensory inputs. For example, distance is related more closely to spatial perception 
and is highly relevant in everyday life. When humans still relied on their own body as the main 
mode of transportation, it was essential to know what distance had been covered and how much 
was still ahead. Overestimation of distances could have protected early humans from undertaking 
dangerous paths of migration. In contrast, underestimating fast motion could serve the purpose of 
reducing motion sickness. Thus, the body and its visually experienced motion might be the 
common metric for evaluating the relative importance of different domains in the overall 
perception of time and space. 
Another result of our study was that the self-reported feelings of presence were not associated 
with ratings of confidence and accuracy in time judgments. Therefore, similar to the first study, 
the subjective connectedness to the virtual world did not affect the actual perception of the IVE. 
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Possibly, there is also an influence of the direction and the acceleration of motion (cf. Grassi & 
Pavan, 2012; Matthews, 2011). However, in two pilot experiments, where I extended the IVE to 
include either accelerated motion (see Figure 3) or additional cars moving toward or away from 
the moving observer (see Figure 4), I could not find such an influence of either of both. 
Taken together, the work reported in this chapter showed that time and space are interdependent 
and that the body serves as an important visuo-spatial reference to our perception of time and 
space. However, previous models supposing that these cross-modal interrelations are 
symmetrical and caused by a common system of magnitude need to be revised. Possibly, the 
visual system, in most cases, offers the highest informational value for our perception of space 
and time, and serves as the dominant system for time-space-judgments. Since every sensation is 
fundamentally perceived – and thus, affected – by the body, the real or virtual body might act as 
the underlying fundamental reference point for the integration of each individual sensation into a 
coherent state of perception. 
 
 
Figure 3. Reproduced time as a function of accelerated or constant motion (F(2, 50) = 0.40, p 




Figure 4. Reproduced time as a function of motion direction (F(2, 62) = 0.98, p = .381) and 
motion velocity (F(1, 31) = 0.04, p = .847) 
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3. Virtual Reality, Mood, and the Experience of Presence 
 
3.1 Theoretical Background 
Coincidentally, at the beginning of my doctoral studies, the first set of modern commercial VR 
HMDs was released (Oculus Rift and HTC Vive). These were not the first commercially available 
VR devices but marked a new beginning. During my studies, I gave several seminar guest 
speeches about the history of VR, where I stressed the fact that VR is a surprisingly old concept. 
One of the first depictions of a hypothetical VR device was that of the holographical glasses in 
the novel Pygmalion's Spectacles by Stanley G. Weinbaum (2015; originally published in 1930). 
The glasses allowed the user to experience very realistic fictional events. The concept of 
experiencing something as real even though it is not gathered popularity in literary works in the 
1950ies with novels and short stories from Ray Bradbury (The Veldt; 1972; originally published 
in 1950), Damon Knight (Hell’s Pavement; 1955), and Isaac Asimov (e.g. Dreaming Is a Private 
Thing; 1955). In the 1960ies, first VR devices were proposed and developed by pioneer Morton 
Heilig (Telesphere Mask and Sensorama; cf. Mazuryk & Gervautz, 1996) and Ivan Sutherland 
advanced theoretical conceptions of VR in his publication Ultimate Display (1965). In the 
1980ies, military and civil research led to the first HMDs such as the Virtual Environment 
Display System (VIVED; 1984; cf. Schroeder, 1993) and the Eyephone (VPL Research Inc., 
1988; cf. Mazuryk & Gervautz, 1996). Even though the popularity of VR started to rise in the 
early 1990ies and VR was now used as a tool for academic research (e.g. foundation of the 
Presence journal in 1992), commercial VR devices such as the Virtual Boy (Nintendo; 1995) did 
not lead to much success (Boyer, 2009). Only beginning in the 2010s, new initiatives were 
started to develop advanced and yet affordable VR displays, an example being the crowdfunding 
campaign by Oculus VR in 2012 (cf. Gleasure & Feller, 2015). 
The new technology became a promising tool for research. Whereas early research was mainly 
concerned with creating collaborative IVEs and enhancing presence in VR (Joslin, Di Giacomo, 
& Magnenat-Thalmann, 2004; Skarbez, Brooks, & Whitton, 2017), nowadays VR is used in 
various contexts such as therapy and surgical training (cf. Bohil et al., 2011; Khalifa et al., 2006). 
In the therapy of phobic disorders, for example, VR allows for controlled structured 
desensitization of patients and has been shown to be an effective addition or replacement of 
traditional fear therapy (Fernández-Álvarez et al., 2019; North & North, 2016). There is also a 
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number of advantages of using VR technology in research. It has been argued that VR offers the 
possibility to create realistic experiences with high external validity and, at the same time, a high 
degree of experimental control (Bohil et al., 2011; Parsons et al., 2017). Thus, VR is ideal for 
complex research designs that would otherwise not be feasible in the laboratory. VR also creates 
opportunities to manipulate variables such as the size of the body or constant self-motion (see 
Weber et al., 2019; Weber, Weibel, & Mast, 2020a). Variables that are impossible or nearly 
impossible to manipulate in a real experimental setting. 
An important covariate in VR experiments is presence. The term presence is originally derived 
from telepresence, the experience of being present at another, distant, location (Akin, Minsky, 
Thiel, & Kurtzman, 1983; cf. McMahan, 2003). In the VR literature, presence is usually defined 
as having a feeling of being there in a mediated environment (Steuer, 1992). Lombard and Ditton 
(1997) instead emphasize the illusion of non-mediation and Waterworth and Waterworth (2001) 
refer to it as a form of perceptual processing. There are many conceptualizations of presence and 
it has been applied to various contexts such as watching movies and reading books (examples 
include: absorption; Baños et al., 1999; arrival; Kim & Biocca, 1997; engagement; Brockmyer 
et al., 2009; narrative immersion (Ryan, 2003); and transportation; Green & Brock, 2000). 
Furthermore, immersion is sometimes used interchangeably with presence (Murray, 1997). Slater 
(e.g. 1999; 2009) consistently referred to immersion as an objective characteristic of a VR 
system, whereas Witmer & Singer (1998) defined immersion as a psychological state influenced 
by individual judgments. Studies have demonstrated that immersion (or presence) is affected by 
personality traits (Weibel, Wissmath, & Mast, 2010; Weibel, Wissmath, & Stricker, 2011). 
Following a proposal by Lombard and colleagues (2000), immersion is, thus, divided into 
perceptual and psychological immersion. In newer literature, (system) immersion is consistently 
used in the sense of an objective characteristic of the system, whereas presence has replaced the 
term psychological immersion and reflects an individual appraisal of the system and a subjective 
feeling of being immersed (i.e. an immersive response; Cummings & Bailenson, 2015; Hein, 
Mai, & Hußmann, 2018; Wu, Gomes, Fernandes, & Wang, 2018). 
There are also many competing questionnaires, each focusing on other aspects of the presence 
experience (for an overview see van Baren & IJsselsteijn, 2004). Furthermore, some studies have 
attempted to measure presence objectively by means of psychophysical methods (cf. Skarbez et 
al., 2017; see Section 3.3). Lombard and colleagues (2000), however, claim that self-reports are 
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the most effective method for measuring presence. In all empirical studies included in this 
doctoral thesis, besides other measures of presence, I used the Pictorial Presence Self-
Assessment Manikin questionnaire by Weibel, Schmutz, Pahud, and Wissmath (Presence SAM; 
2015). This questionnaire is intended to measure presence intuitively and non-verbally using 
pictograms representing different extents of being involved and physically present in the medium 
(graphical representations were inspired by the Self-Assessment Manikin to measure emotion; 
Lang, 1980). This represents another approach for measuring the subjective impression of 
presence. 
Immersion in the sense of presence has been used to improve spatial perception (Steinicke et al., 
2009) as well as to recover from stress and improve mood (Reinecke, Klatt, & Krämer, 2011; 
Rieger, Frischlich, Wulf, Bente, & Kneer, 2015). In Manuscript III of this thesis, I studied the 
influence of objective immersion on mood improvement and differentiated it from the influence 
of individual presence. Furthermore, in Manuscript IV, I reviewed current definitions and 
measurements of presence and devised a distinction between presence as being there and 
presence as the perceived realism of a system and argued how this could improve the theoretical 
understanding of presence and lead to better operationalizations of presence in questionnaires. In 
the next sections, the theoretical framework, findings, and implications of these two manuscripts 
are described. 
 
3.2 Mood Enhancement Through the Experience of Presence in Gaming 
Immersive experiences are thought to lead to better mood and improved recovery from work-
related stress. Reinecke (2009b) referred to the recovery concept from organizational psychology 
as introduced by Sonnentag and Zijlstra (2006). Therefore, recovery is defined as a renewal of 
depleted physical and psychological resources after phases of stress and strain. Four aspects of 
successful recovery were identified by Sonnentag and Fritz (2007): psychological detachment, 
relaxation, mastery, and control. Reinecke (2009a; b) has argued that immersive experiences are 
connected to psychological detachment because they stop negative cognitions and prevent 
episodes of rumination. Feelings of immersion could also contribute to the other aspects of 
recovery (cf. Klimmt & Hartmann, 2006; please note that “immersion” was often used 
interchangeably with “presence” in this particular field of research). 
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Indeed, studies using computer games as an intervention have shown that immersive experiences 
go along with increased recovery from work-related stress and mood repair. Reinecke and 
colleagues (2011) showed that involvement was associated with the subjective experience of 
recovery and recovery itself was connected to higher levels of enjoyment. Involvement is part of 
the presence experience as defined by Witmer and Singer (1998). Involvement was also related 
to interactivity – a loosely defined term described by the authors as active participation of the 
player and control over the game's progress (see Smuts, 2009, for an overview of the definition 
of interactivity). As such, interactivity shares similarities with (system) immersion. Interactivity 
– a digital game compared to a mindfulness app condition – was also connected to increased 
daily recovery experiences in a more recent study (Collins, Cox, Wilcock, & Sethu-Jones, 2019). 
Additionally, interactivity was shown to be positively associated with mood repair (Rieger et al.; 
2015). Furthermore, two studies by Bowman and Tamborini (2012; 2015) have shown that task 
demand of a computer game is linked to mood repair. The authors stated that their definition of 
task demand is similar to interactivity. Improving mood is a more immediate effect of gaming 
and is thought to result from the desire to avert negative mood while at the same time 
maximizing positive mood by selecting appropriate media (cf. Mood management; Bryant & 
Zillmann, 1984; Zillman, 2000). The goal is to achieve an optimal state of mood (Bowman & 
Tamborini, 2012). This can be achieved by either reducing negative emotions or by increasing 
positive emotions in the sense of building up positive resources as a means of coping with new 
situations (cf. Conservation of resources theory; Hobfoll, 1989). 
Interactivity and task demand are conceptually related to immersion since immersion is also 
thought to depend on possible interactions with the system (McMahan, 2003). However, there 
are no studies that specifically manipulated immersion, nor any study that investigated the role of 
individually experienced presence in computer games. Therefore, my colleagues and I studied 
both immersion and presence in the context of computer games (Weber, Mast, & Weibel, 2020; 
see Manuscript III in the appendix). Immersion was manipulated by means of a computer game 
varying in the degree of expected immersion between conditions. The low immersion condition 
involved watching someone else play the game, the medium immersion condition involved 
playing the game on the desktop computer, and the high immersion condition involved playing 
the game in VR. Thus, we were the first to implement a VR condition to study the effect of mood 
repair in computer games. This is important because VR is increasing in popularity and is used 
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as a tool for gaming by millions of players (ReportLinker, 2019) and the illusion of presence is 
especially relevant for experiencing VR (cf. Steuer, 1992). A few studies have indicated that 
presence might indeed be beneficial for reducing stress (e.g. de Kort, Meijnders, Sponselee, & 
IJsselsteijn, 2006; Valtchanov & Ellard, 2010). However, these studies involved a relaxation task 
in a VR nature setting that was specifically designed to improve mood and the distinct 
contributions of system immersion and individual presence were not explored. Therefore, we 
also measured presence with the Presence SAM questionnaire and connected it to mood changes 
after the low, medium, or high immersion gaming activity. 
Our results showed that both active gaming conditions improved positive emotions, whereas the 
low immersion video condition did not lead to changes in positive emotions. All conditions were 
able to decrease negative emotions. Using a moderation analysis, we could show that – in 
addition to the immersion of the condition – self-reported presence was associated with increased 
positive emotions in the VR condition. In a mediation analysis, we could furthermore show that 
presence improved positive emotions indirectly through enhancing the enjoyment of the activity 
– again in addition to the effect of immersion. These findings were interpreted as confirming 
previous results and extending the beneficial effect of immersive experiences in games on mood 
to instances of presence and the use of VR gaming. Further discussion of the results is provided 
in Section 3.4. 
 
3.3 Defining Presence with Being There and Perceived Realism 
Presence is sometimes used as a quality measurement for IVEs. Game developers aim to increase 
the immersion (i.e. the potential for eliciting presence) of their environments to enhance their 
favorability and to bind players to the game. A strain of research attempted to enhance presence 
in an IVE by using a transitional environment. Such an environment typically consists of a 
virtual replica of the room in which the experiment takes place. Participants are supposed to 
familiarize themselves with the properties of the VR display, explore the qualities of the virtually 
replicated surroundings and strengthen the feeling of being in the virtual world. Afterward, they 
set foot in a new IVE by walking through the door or a portal in the wall of the transitional 
environment. In an arbitrary task in this new environment, they should experience improved 
feelings of presence and show better performances in terms of judging distances and sizes of the 
virtual world compared to when directly entering the targeted IVE. This proposition was 
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empirically supported in a series of experiments (Steinicke et al., 2009; Steinicke, Bruder, 
Hinrichs, Steed, & Gerlach, 2009). In a pilot study, I replicated this procedure by using a virtual 
replica of the laboratory room and a consecutive simple searching task in a large closed space (a 
Japanese dojo; see Figure 5) that could be accessed through the door of the laboratory room. In 
reference to a study by Slater, Steed, McCarthy, and Marinelli (1998), I referred to the 
transitional environment as the ante room. There were conditions with and without haptic 
exploration of the ante room and a control condition without a transitional environment. The 
results indicated that the ante room improved presence in the following task but there was no 
additional effect of haptic exploration (see Figure 6). 
 
 
Figure 5. The virtual environment used for the searching task (right panel). The small upper 





Figure 6. Main effect of the condition on presence scores in the searching task environment as 
indicated by the Presence Questionnaire (Witmer & Singer, 1998; F(2, 42) = 3.39, p = .043). 
Note: the subjective rating of cyber sickness on a scale from 0 to 20 was included as a covariate 
because a few participants reported strong symptoms of cyber sickness (not shown in the figure) 
 
Even though achieving a high level of presence is a key desire for VR research and presence is 
probably assessed in a majority of VR experiments, there is still much confusion about the term. 
One source of confusion is that, in colloquial speech, presence is often referred to as immersion. 
The origin of the term immersion is the idea to dissolve in a virtual world like a fluid poured into 
a pool and be surrounded by the water (cf. Murray, 1997). However, as I have discussed in 
Section 3.1, immersion is also used more specifically to refer to the characteristics of the IVE 
and its abilities to evoke immersive experiences. Presence, on the other hand, is derived from 
telepresence and was predominantly used to refer to the individual immersive experiences in VR 
(see Section 3.1). 
Another source of confusion is that there is much disagreement over the best way to assess 
presence. Some authors suggested that physiological and behavioral methods would be a 
valuable addition to self-reports. However, no consensus about the correct measure was reached 
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and there are open questions about the validity of the proposed methods. As an example, 
responses to threatening stimuli were surmised to indicate the level of presence (Sheridan, 1992). 
Another example are postural responses to experiences of virtual motion as proposed in a study 
by Freeman, Avons, Meddis, Pearson, and IJsselsteijn (2000). However, this study found no 
significant relationship between self-reported presence and postural responses. 
One problem in measuring presence with physiological and behavioral proxy variables is that 
these variables typically rely on the allocation of attention to the virtual world. In an opinion 
article (Weber, Weibel, & Mast, 2020b; Manuscript IV in the appendix), together with my 
colleagues, I argued that most common definitions of presence are linked to attention and that 
being there is predominantly used to describe presence. However, we think that this focus on 
being there is problematic, especially with the advanced VR devices of today: If one wears an 
HMD that blocks external visual and auditory signals and a significant part of the visual field is 
occupied by the virtual world, one effectively is there. Therefore, by definition, presence should 
be very high and there would be not much of a difference between different IVEs. This is clearly 
not the case since a simple IVE involving a poorly designed world (e.g. simple geometrical 
figures in empty space) is usually experienced quite differently than a carefully designed, 
realistic IVE that involves a coherent story, authentic characters and provides opportunities for 
exploring and challenging oneself (e.g. Lone Echo from the Ready at Dawn studio, a highly 
appraised VR game). Thus, we propose that perceived realism is the second pillar of the presence 
concept besides the feeling of being there. Together these aspects constitute the presence 
experience. Perceived realism is defined in our manuscript as an individual judgment about the 
degree of realism of the IVE, whereby realism encompasses the technical fidelity of the system 
(e.g. resolution, tracking quality), the perceptual quality of the IVE (e.g. shades, textures), and 
the coherence of the story (e.g. is it plausible, are there inconsistencies?). Thus, it is a 
comprehensive judgment involving different aspects and is very much depending on individual 
predispositions like one's immersive tendency (Jerome & Witmer, 2002), the situational 
suspension-of-disbelief (Schaper, 1978), and personal preferences. Even though realism was part 
of previous conceptualizations (e.g. Alexander, Brunyé, Sidman, & Weil, 2005; Baños et al., 
2000; Stoffregen, Bardy, Smart, & Pagulayan, 2003), it received little attention in the most 
influential theories of presence and is often regarded merely as a beneficial factor for the feeling 
of being there (e.g. Lombard & Ditton, 1997). Additionally, questionnaires often do not properly 
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distinguish between attentional aspects and realism judgments and include questions that are 
confusing for the user (cf. Weber, Weibel, & Mast, 2020b). Therefore, deriving a new concept of 
presence that differentiates between attentional allocation (being there) and judgments about the 
plausibility of the IVE (perceived realism) could help develop better operationalizations of 
presence in questionnaires. Further conclusions are provided in the next section. 
 
3.4 Discussion 
Presence was an important variable in all manuscripts included in this thesis. In the study on 
spatial perception of virtual objects, the level of presence varied between the ownership and 
disownership conditions (Weber et al., 2019; Manuscript I). This suggests that experiencing the 
illusion of virtual body ownership improves the sensation of feeling present in an IVE. This is a 
finding also reported in other studies (Lok, Naik, Whitton, & Brooks, 2003; Waltemate, Gall, 
Roth, Botsch, & Latoschik, 2018). However, along with ownership, the level of presence was not 
associated with different size judgments of objects. Thus, presence in our study was not 
associated with better performance in a perceptual task. Interestingly, in another study (Weber, 
Weibel, & Mast, 2020a; Manuscript II), we found that presence was also not associated with 
better performance in time judgments. Thus, surprisingly, I could not find any relation between 
presence and the perception of space and time in IVEs. This conflicts with other studies which 
showed that presence improves distance perception (e.g. Ahmed, Cohen, Binder, & Fennema, 
2010; Ries, Interrante, Anderson, & Lindquist, 2006). Possibly, the contribution of presence 
depends on context: In the study assessing subjective time, we argued that time intervals may not 
have been perceived as being based on the virtual world per se and that time was judged 
independently from the feeling of being present. In the study assessing object sizes, the body 
might have been the dominant perceptual reference, overshadowing a possible contribution of 
presence. However, as these are only speculations, more research is needed for assessing 
bounding factors for the contribution of presence on sensory perception. 
In contrast to these results, presence was an important intervening variable in feelings of mood 
(Weber, Mast, & Weibel, 2020; Manuscript III). We could show that presence leads to more 
enjoyment of a gaming activity and this in turn enhances positive emotions. Presence was 
especially important in the VR condition, showing an additional effect to immersion. Possibly, 
when being surrounded by an IVE (by using an HMD), having a feeling of presence is more 
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important than in situations where there is a gap between the user and the screen (desktop and 
video conditions). To develop this thought further, the perceptual qualities of the IVE may have 
been more relevant in the VR condition since one already experiences the feeling of being there. 
Being present in an environment that subjectively looks realistic and convincing may be a strong 
boost for the individual immersive experience and lead to improved positive emotions. Building 
up positive emotions is a way of creating additional resources for coping with future events. 
However, one limitation of our study was that negative emotions did not decrease further with 
higher immersion or presence. This contrasts with other studies (Chen & Raney, 2009; Rieger et 
al., 2015) and may show that the choice of the game and the way of measuring mood is crucial 
for determining the intervention potential of computer games. Along with previous work, our 
results suggest that active gaming is an effective coping strategy for reducing negative thoughts, 
building up resources and recovering from stress and strain. As such, it could be used as a 
clinical tool in stress therapy. In contrast, our results show that watching others play may not be 
as effective as active gaming, possibly because of a lack of competition and control. 
Presence may affect how VR experiments are perceived and how they affect behavior, although 
the work shown here has demonstrated instances where presence did not influence perception in 
VR. It is vital to create and establish valid and reliable measures of presence. We have shown a 
distinction of presence into being there and perceived realism that could improve the 
understanding of presence in VR and lead to better operationalizations of presence. According to 
the medium used (e.g. VR or desktop), either being there or perceived realism should be the 
focus of measurement in order to separate media effects resulting from attentional allocation and 
the subjective judgment of realism. It is conceivable, for example, that the subjective realism of 
an immersive IVE is especially important for sensory perception. Thus, further research should 
investigate the individual contributions of being there and perceived realism on various media 
effects. 
Taken together, our results strongly suggest that VR is a valuable research tool and can be used 
to design experiments that are either not feasible or have significant disadvantages in a 
traditional setting. This is reflected in the use of unaccelerated motion and the use of unnaturally 
tall or short self-representations as well as the control over environmental variables such as 
attentional demand and visual surroundings. However, our results also hint at possible caveats in 
transferring findings from traditional experiments into VR settings. This may apply to certain 
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situations, namely when using virtual self-representations in perception studies. It will be an 
interesting task in the future to pinpoint the specific conditions which are responsible for this 
discrepancy.  
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4. General Conclusion 
 
The studies presented in this doctoral thesis demonstrated an interrelation between time and 
space and indicated that the body serves as a spatial reference system for the perception of both. 
The results from my experiments implicate that the own self and its characteristics in terms of 
overall size and self-displacement offer high informational value for spatial perception. Einstein 
wrote that "in the case of words such as "place" or "space," whose relation with psychological 
experience is less direct, there exists a far-reaching uncertainty of interpretation" (foreword in 
Jammer, 1954, p. xii). Because we might rely on a common psychological system of space in 
order to make perceptual judgments, the self and its characteristics serve not only as a spatial cue 
but as a fundamental reference to all our perception and reduce our uncertainty about space. The 
own self is defining our relationship with the world similar to the frame of a painting 
encompassing the work of art. Since the body and its sensory organs are the gateways to every 
possible sensation, it seems plausible that the entirety of our perception is processed according to 
its relevance to our body. As such, perceiving high levels of self-displacement as longer in 
duration might, for example, serve the purpose of preparing action in life-threatening situations 
such as car accidents. Another idea is that the sizes of objects are judged in reference to our body 
and, thus, according to their potential hazard. As previously suggested, the mappings of different 
perceptual domains show asymmetrical properties and, based on context or informational value, 
different weights can be placed on the sensory input systems. Presence on the other hand, might 
determine the extent to which a virtual world is attended and enjoyed, but might not be as 
important for our perception in IVEs as previously thought. 
Furthermore, the results of this thesis show that presence supports the emotional processing of 
negative mood states, but no benefit of experiencing presence in judging the size of objects or 
estimating intervals of time could be demonstrated. Additionally, the results showed that 
watching others play might not be a viable strategy for mood regulation. 
There is a wide range of practical implications of these findings. My work shows important 
caveats in using VR for perceptual training or telesurgery. The failure of demonstrating the own-
body-size effect in VR indicates that caution is advised when transferring the findings of 
traditional studies into VR settings. At least, users seem to engage in flexible relationships with 
virtual self-representations. This also affects VR treatments of body disorders such as anorexia 
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nervosa or muscle dysmorphia, where distortions of virtual bodies are used to change self-
referential cognition. My results indicate that avatars need not be in close physical space in order 
to affect basic perceptual judgments. Furthermore, interventions to reduce racial bias by 
embodying users in unfamiliar bodies need to be evaluated in terms of transferability to the 
external world. Similarly, my results show that caution is needed when planning interventions 
for reducing the subjective duration of unpleasant experiences. For example, VR racing games 
might not be suitable for reducing the subjective duration of dental operations because fast 
motion of virtual surroundings leads to a lengthened impression of time. This has also 
implications for real-life driving, as one might underestimate time when driving with high speeds 
and, hence, also underestimate one’s fatigue. 
Another conclusion drawn from the results in this thesis is that – despite showing deviances from 
laboratory studies in terms of the own-body-size effect – VR itself is a promising tool for 
investigating variables that remain otherwise impossible to study. Users are able to form 
ownership feelings towards unnaturally tall and short avatars. Additionally, non-accelerated 
motion was well tolerated by participants. My findings also indicate possible uses of virtual 
replicas of laboratory rooms to design perceptual experiments and to provide gradual transitions 
to VR experiences. Lastly, my results offer insights into possible future approaches to protect 
against willfully induced perceptual illusions in VR that could become more common once VR 
will be widely used by the general public. I suspect that manipulations of one's virtual self-
representation could be used in the future to affect our perceptual judgment of the virtual world. I 
advise researchers to continue investigating the relationship between the body and perception in 
order to deepen our understanding and take measures against willful manipulation. As the 
ancient Greek philosopher Democritus said: 
"We know nothing accurately in reality, but [only] as it changes according to the bodily 
condition, and the constitution of those things that flow upon [the body] and impinge upon it" 
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Abstract 
Previous research indicates that the size of the own body affects the judgment of objects’ 
size, depending on the amount of subjective ownership towards the body (Van der Hoort, 
Guterstam, & Ehrsson, 2011). We are the first to transfer this own-body-size effect into a virtual 
environment. In a series of three experiments, participants (N = 68) had to embody small, 
medium, and large avatars and judge the size of objects. Body ownership was manipulated using 
synchronous and asynchronous touch. We also included a new paradigm with an additional 
change of perspective to induce stronger ownership (Experiment 2). Additionally, we assessed 
whether the visibility of the body during the judgment phase influenced the results (Experiment 
3). In all three experiments, we found an overestimation in a small and an underestimation in a 
large body compared to a medium body. However, size estimation did not depend on the degree 
of ownership despite clear differences in self-reported ownership. Our results show that a virtual 
reality scenario does not require a visuotactile manipulation of ownership in order to evoke the 
own-body-size effect. Our validation of the effect in a virtual setting may be helpful for the 
design of clinical applications. 
Keywords: own-body-size effect, ownership, virtual reality, size perception, embodiment, avatars  
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1. Introduction 
The size of our body serves as a reference frame to the perception of our world (Harris et 
al., 2015; Proffitt & Linkenauger, 2013). The influence of the body on mental processes is 
generally referred to as embodied cognition (Wilson, 2002). In popular culture the impact of 
shrinking humans to the size of insects has been considered numerous times (e.g. in the movie 
Honey, I Shrunk the Kids and its sequels; Cox, & Johnston, 1999). The question whether such a 
transformation of the physical size of the own body would affect the perception of the 
environment was investigated in a series of pioneering experiments by Van der Hoort and 
colleagues (Van der Hoort, Guterstam, & Ehrsson, 2011; Van der Hoort & Ehrsson, 2014; 2016). 
Using an arrangement of cameras capturing artificial bodies and projecting the video feed onto 
participant's goggles, the participants had the feeling of being inside the body of dolls of various 
sizes (i.e. they had a feeling of body ownership; cf. De Vignemont, 2011). The sensation of 
ownership resulted in an altered estimation of object sizes. In the present study, we provide a 
first-time replication of these experiments in a virtual reality (VR) setup. In a series of three 
experiments, we recreated the original procedures and transferred them into a virtual 
environment. We formulated hypotheses based on the original findings and aimed at reproducing 
the results. In the following, we will discuss the original experiments in more detail and point out 
how a VR adaptation extends the knowledge about embodiment and body ownership in virtual 
environments. 
In the original experiments, having ownership of bodies with different sizes changed the 
perception of box-shaped objects: In comparison to ownership of a normal-sized body, 
ownership of a small body resulted in an overestimation of the size of objects and, conversely, 
ownership of a large body resulted in an underestimation (Van der Hoort et al., 2011). This 
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tendency of the perceptual system to regress towards the middle is referred to as contraction bias 
(Poulton, 1989). The contraction bias suggests a tendency to overestimate small and 
underestimate large magnitudes when there is a possibility to compare both to an intermediate 
reference magnitude. In the experimental setup, cameras captured the body of a doll lying on a 
mattress from a first person perspective (1PP) and transmitted the video feed to a participant 
wearing a head-mounted display (HMD). Using this setup, the participant had the view of the 
doll as it was his or her own body, except for the size of the body, which varied between 30 cm 
and 400 cm. Van der Hoort et al. (2011) used synchronous and asynchronous stroking of the 
participant’s body and the doll’s body in order to manipulate the level of experienced ownership 
(Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). When applying this manipulation in 
combination with doll bodies of different sizes, the magnitude of the contraction bias was more 
pronounced in the synchronous condition (Van der Hoort et al., 2011). This was referred to as 
the own-body-size effect. 
Van der Hoort et al. (2011) point out that the own-body-size effect is of great value in the 
context of tele-robotics and VR. They provide the following example of the benefit of simulated 
bodies: “a surgeon could experience a full-body illusion of “being” a microrobot performing 
surgery inside the patient's body”. This type of setting could be implemented in VR. However, 
although Van der Hoort and colleagues explicitly point out that their findings are important for 
VR, they themselves did not use this technology. Therefore, it is a crucial question whether the 
own-body-size effect also applies to an immersive virtual environment (IVE). Does object 
perception in VR follow the same mechanisms as in real life? Previous studies suggested that 
perception in VR indeed differs from perception in real life. One example is the underestimation 
of room size and distances in VR (cf. Loomis & Knapp, 2003; Renner, Velichkovsky, & 
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Helmert, 2013). Additionally, the quality of current HMDs does not match the abilities of the 
human perceptual system (e.g. image resolution, frame rate, etc.). This limits the extent to which 
we can transfer results about human perception into VR. Moreover, there is also a reduced 
quality of depth cues, concerning for example shadows, textures, and occlusion of objects. Thus, 
it is not clear whether it is possible to replicate the own-body-size effect in a virtual setting and if 
the same rules for ownership and perception apply. To address these questions, we investigated 
the own-body-size effect in an IVE. We used the same paradigm as Van der Hoort and 
colleagues but with avatars instead of dolls and virtual objects instead of real objects. Our main 
goal was to assess the impact of an ownership manipulation on the own-body-size effect in an 
IVE. 
There is still scarce knowledge about the use of VR technology and its influence on body 
ownership with the only exception being two studies. One study demonstrated an effect of the 
size of one’s virtual hands on the perceived size of objects (Linkenauger, Leyrer, Bülthoff, & 
Mohler, 2013). A contraction bias for objects was observed only when one’s own hands were 
altered but not the hands of an avatar on the other side of the table. However, there was no 
assessment of ownership of the two perspective conditions. In the second VR study, Banakou, 
Groten, and Slater (2013) used mappings of body movements to embody participants into a 
virtual child or small adult body. They observed a general overestimation of the size of box-
shaped objects for both bodies compared to a baseline condition where participants made 
judgments from the same perspective but without a visible body. There was no such difference 
during asynchronous mappings of the participant’s movements. However, it was not the size but 
the implied age of the body that was supposed to be responsible for the size estimation bias. 
Furthermore, it is unclear in what way the advantage of having a body in the IVE could have 
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contributed to these findings (cf. Ries, Interrante, Kaeding, & Anderson, 2008; Mohler, Creem-
Regehr, Thompson, & Bülthoff, 2010).  
Although these studies demonstrate an effect of body size on judgments of object size, in 
both cases the setup was significantly modified when compared to the original studies by Van 
Hoort and colleagues. In the original paradigm, the size of the whole body affected size 
judgments in the far extra-personal space. Body size varied systematically from very small to 
very large bodies and each condition was implemented with the same perspective. It is still 
unclear whether this original paradigm can be transferred successfully to an IVE. As mentioned 
above, the authors already discussed the importance for such a transfer in terms of tele-robotics. 
Besides that, a successful replication would confirm embodiment theory in an IVE by 
establishing a proposed mechanism in which the body acts as a reference frame for perception. 
This could also help to explain the so-called Proteus effects (Yee & Bailenson, 2007), according 
to which a transformed self-representation in an IVE influences the user’s behavior (e.g. his or 
her confidence in a negotiation task). As such, a successful replication would have implications 
for the design of virtual environments such as determining optimal body size transformations (cf. 
IJsselsteijn, de Kort, & Haans, 2006). It can also help to clarify whether future studies on 
embodiment can be transferred into IVEs. In embodiment research, IVEs have a number of 
benefits, including the possibility of flexibly altering one’s own body and inducing ownership of 
exotic external bodies (e.g. animals). If basic external perception is influenced by virtual bodies, 
they can also have strong impacts on the perception of the own body. This has implications for 
the development of treatments for body image distortions such as anorexia nervosa. VR is 
already being used as a tool for investigating and treating eating disorders (Ferrer-García, & 
Gutiérrez-Maldonado, 2012). Future applications could involve body transformations to restore a 
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healthy body image. Other potential areas of interest for body transformations are the treatment 
of phantom limb pain (Murray et al., 2007), body integrity identity disorder (First, 2005), virtual 
training methods for motor tasks in the context of surgery or sports (Gurusamy, Aggarwal, 
Palanivelu, & Davidson, 2008), and self-identification in computer games (Klevjer, 2012). 
To assess the own-body size effect in an IVE, we conducted three experiments, which we 
designed as close as possible to the original paradigm of Van der Hoort and colleagues. Thus, we 
created a virtual version of our laboratory room and placed avatars on a virtual mattress. The size 
of the avatar bodies varied in size from 30 cm to 350 cm. All participants experienced three 
different sized avatars during the experiments: a small, a medium, and a large avatar. The 
participants were lying on an identical mattress in the real room and experienced the virtual room 
via an HMD. The potential magnitude of ownership feelings toward the avatar was manipulated 
using synchronous and asynchronous visuotactile stimulation that was applied to the real and 
virtual body. In the asynchronous condition of the second and third experiment, also the view 
was changed to a third person perspective (3PP) to further disrupt ownership feelings. In all three 
experiments, box-shaped objects were then presented in the far extra-personal space and 
participants had to judge their size. Whereas the avatar body was still visible in the first and 
second experiments during this judgment phase, in the third experiment we removed the body to 
assess whether the body acted as a visual reference cue. 
In line with the findings of Van der Hoort and colleagues, we postulated the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: The subjectively experienced amount of ownership is higher in the synchronous 
condition compared to the asynchronous condition. 
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Hypothesis 2: The size of objects during ownership of a small body is overestimated and the 
size of objects during ownership of a large body is underestimated with respect to the medium 
sized body (contraction bias). 
Hypothesis 3: The contraction effect in the size estimation task is stronger in the synchronous 
condition compared to the asynchronous condition (own-body-size effect). 
A successful manipulation of ownership is important for replicating the own-body-size 
effect (Hypothesis 1). Support for Hypothesis 2 would indicate that there is an effect of the size 
of the virtual body on the estimation of object size. However, in order to fully replicate the own-
body-size effect, there should only be a contraction bias if there is a sufficient amount of 
ownership. Assuming that the manipulation of ownership is successful, the contraction bias is 
expected in the synchronous condition only (Hypothesis 3). 
2. General Method 
2.1 Participants 
Overall, 68 healthy adult participants were recruited (53 females and 15 males, age: M = 
22.3 years, SD = 3.8 years). The numbers for each experiment were as follows: Experiment 1: 22 
(18 females, 4 males, M = 22.6 years, SD = 4.6 years); Experiment 2: 26 (20 females, 6 males, M 
= 22.5 years, SD = 3.6 years); Experiment 3: 20 (15 females, 5 males, M = 21.7 years, SD = 3.1 
years). All participants had normal or corrected to normal vision. 
Participants received credit points as an exchange for their participation. All participants 
provided written informed consent to take part in this study and were treated in accordance with 
the protocol approved by the Ethical Committee of the Faculty of Human Sciences of the 
University of Bern and with the Code of Ethics of the World Medical Association (Declaration 
of Helsinki). All participants were debriefed after the experiment. 
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2.2 Design and Material 
2.2.1 Design. There were a total of six conditions that every participant had to undergo in 
a within-subjects design. This resulted from a 3-by-2 design with three different bodies (small, 
medium, and large; see Figure 1) and two visuotactile stimulation conditions (synchronous and 
asynchronous touch). Conditions were presented in a random order. The dependent variables 
were ratings of presence and ownership and size judgments of the objects. 
2.2.2 Virtual room and equipment. The experiment took place in a laboratory room 
with the dimensions 635 cm (length), 501 cm (width), and 277 cm (height). We created a virtual 
replica of the room with the exact same configuration and the exact same dimensions, including 
all tables, chairs, cabinets and doors (see Figure 2). In a corner of the room lay a mattress, which 
was also replicated in the IVE. Participants wore an Oculus Development Kit 2 HMD (Oculus 
VR, LLC., Irvine, United States) that was connected to a laptop computer (Intel i7 processor, 16 
GB RAM and NVidia GeForce GTX 970M graphics card). The computer was also replicated 
and shown in the IVE. Its size was always scaled in accordance with the respective virtual body. 
The reason for this was that participants had to use the trackpad of the computer for making size 
judgments. Therefore, their sense of touch had to match their visual input in order not to disrupt 
the illusion. We used neutral looking avatars that were matched for gender (WorldViz LLC., 
Santa Barbara, United States). Due to limitations of the room’s available space, the size of the 
large avatar was set to 350 cm instead of 400 cm as in the study by Van der Hoort et al. (2011). 
However, as in the study of Van der Hoort et al., the size of the small avatar was 30 cm and the 
size of the medium sized avatar was 180 cm. The participants were set to the same position in the 
room as the respective avatar. Real and virtual bodies were also both aligned perpendicular to the 
short wall of the room. Because the size of the avatar also affected the eye height, the virtual 
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mattress was elevated or lowered to adjust for the difference. For the size estimation task, three 
white box-shaped objects were used. Their edge lengths were 10 cm, 20 cm, and 40 cm, in all 
conditions. They were presented in a random order in front of the participants at a fixed distance 
of approximately 450 cm from the position of the participants’ eyes. A few other objects such as 
tables and chairs were also visible and served as familiar size cues (identical in the real and the 
virtual room). Other potential size cues, such as binocular disparity and eye convergence, were 
also implemented in the virtual room and remained constant across all conditions. However, due 
to technical limitations, it is currently not possible to alter the accommodation of the pupil in an 
HMD. Therefore, accommodation cues in the IVE did not conform to the real world but 
remained constant in all conditions. The HMD was set to allow only rotational but not 
translational movement to prevent participants from changing the perspective. The field of view 
(FOV) was set to 90 degrees. 
2.2.3 Measurements: To assess the subjective ownership of the participants, we 
developed a small questionnaire that is composed of seven statements used by Van der Hoort et 
al. (2011) and Piryankova et al. (2014). An example item is “during the experiment, there were 
times when I felt as if the avatar's body was my body”. Answers were given on a Likert scale 
ranging from fully disagree (1) to fully agree (7). Similar questionnaires were used in previous 
studies about ownership (e.g. Dobricki, & de la Rosa, 2013; Normand, Giannopoulos, Spanlang, 
& Slater, 2011). Furthermore, the internal structure of these questionnaires has been assessed in 
psychometric studies (Longo & Haggard, 2012; Longo, Schüür, Kammers, Tsakiris, & Haggard, 
2008). In our study, the internal consistency of the ownership questionnaire was good 
(Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.81). The questionnaire can be found in the Appendix. All questions were 
presented in German. 
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Furthermore, we assessed levels of presence using the Pictorial Presence SAM 
questionnaire (Weibel, Schmutz, Pahud, & Wissmath, 2015), which consists of five pictograms 
each depicting different levels of presence. For each sequence, one of the pictograms that best 
fits the participants’ subjective experience has to be chosen. The answer is then transformed into 
a number from one to five.  
The third dependent measure was the subjective rating of the objects’ size. Participants 
gave their judgments by choosing a numeric value from a list. The list contained values from 5 to 
60 cm in steps of 5 cm. 
2.3 Procedure 
At the beginning of the experiment, the use of the HMD and the purpose of the virtual 
room were explained to the participants. They were then asked to lie down on the mattress and 
put on the HMD. There was a short phase in which the participants could familiarize themselves 
with the virtual room. 
Next, the visuotactile stimulation was administered. This procedure differed between 
Experiment 1 and Experiments 2 and 3. It is described in the respective sections below. 
After the stimulation phase, the three test objects were successively presented to the 
participants who had to judge their size by indicating the edge length via direct numerical 
assessment (chosen from a list of possible values; see Measurements section above). Judgments 
were made using the trackpad of the nearby laptop computer. Participants did not need to remove 
the HMD in order to give their judgments. This part of the experiment differed between 
Experiments 1 and 2 (the virtual body was still visible) and Experiment 3 (the virtual body was 
invisible). At the end of a trial, they were asked to remove the HMD and complete the ownership 
and presence questionnaires on the computer. The whole procedure was repeated for each of the 
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six conditions. An overview of the differences between the three experiments can be found in 
Table 1. 
3. Experiment 1 
3.1 Method 
The general structure of the experiment is described above in the Procedure section. For 
the visuotactile stimulation, we used a rod to touch participants 20 times each on the lower left 
leg, the right thigh, and the stomach. This took about one and a half minute. There was also a 
virtual rod that touched the virtual body on the same spots. Each virtual touch was started by a 
button press. This allowed the examiner to apply touches either synchronously or 
asynchronously to the participant and the virtual body. For the asynchronous touch in 
Experiment 1, the examiner randomly delayed either the press of the button or the touch of the 
rod on the real body by approximately 1 s. The size of the rod remained constant in respect to the 
size of the virtual body. 
3.2 Results 
3.2.1 Ownership and presence. To test whether the visuotactile stimulation had worked 
as intended, we analyzed questionnaire data from the ownership and presence questionnaires. An 
overview of descriptive statistics can be found in Table 2. A two-way repeated measures analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) with stimulation and body size as factors indicated that ownership was 
higher in the synchronous condition compared to the asynchronous condition (main effect of 
stimulation), F(1, 18) = 14.70, p = .001, ηp
2 = 0.45. This was not true, however, for control 
questions, F(1, 18) = 0.07, p = .796, ηp
2 = 0.00, indicating that the effect of stimulation was 
limited to questions about ownership and that there was not a general tendency to agree to the 
statements. In both analyses, the interaction and the main effect of body size were not significant 
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(all p > .05). Results for presence ratings were similar: There was only a main effect of 
stimulation, F(1, 18) = 6.39, p = .021, ηp
2 = 0.26. All other effects were not significant (all p > 
.05). These results indicate that the manipulation of ownership was successful (Hypothesis 1): 
synchronous stimulation evoked higher levels of subjective ownership and presence. 
Additionally, ownership and presence did not depend on the size of the body. 
In addition to the ownership and presence questionnaires, we also asked participants 
about their impression of the room's size and their judgments about their perceived age in all 
three avatar bodies. There was a linear effect of body size concerning the questions "I felt 
younger than I actually am" (F(1, 18) = 22.07, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.55) and "I felt older than I 
actually am" (F(1, 18) = 9.76, p = .006, ηp
2 = 0.35), suggesting that participants felt younger in 
the small body and older in the large body. Similarly, there were linear effects of body size on 
the perceived size of the room: in the small body, the room appeared bigger than in the large 
body, F(1, 18) = 40.82, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.69, and in the large body, the room appeared smaller 
than in the small body, F(1, 18) = 23.92, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.57. 
3.2.2 Size judgments. To test Hypotheses 2 and 3, we computed a two-way repeated 
measures ANOVA with body size and stimulation as factors and the difference between real size 
and estimated size of the test objects as dependent measure. According to Hypothesis 2, we 
expected a main effect of body size, whereas Hypothesis 3 required a significant interaction 
between body size and stimulation. We found a significant main effect of body size, F(1.35, 
24.29) = 11.41, p = .001, ηp
2 = 0.39 (degrees of freedom were adjusted using Greenhouse-
Geisser correction). There was a linear trend (p = .002) for body size, suggesting that there was 
an overestimation of size in the small body and an underestimation of size in the large body 
compared to judgments in the medium body (Figure 3). Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is supported by 
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our data: There was a contraction bias. However, there was no interaction between body size and 
stimulation, F(2, 36) = 1.07, p = .355, ηp
2 = 0.06, and the main effect of stimulation was also not 
significant, F(1, 18) = 1.05, p = .318, ηp
2 = 0.06, see Figure 3. Thus, Hypothesis 3 (own-body-
size effect) received no empirical support. 
3.3 Discussion 
We could successfully manipulate ownership according to the results in the 
questionnaires. We observed an effect of body size on the judgment of objects’ size. Thus, we 
were able to reproduce the contraction bias. Nevertheless, we could not fully support the own-
body-size effect as reported by Van Der Hoort and colleagues: there was no interaction between 
body size and stimulation. Two possible explanations need to be considered: 1) ownership is not 
crucial for the contraction bias and the mere presence of a virtual body at or near the location of 
the participant’s real body accounts for the bias (explanation 1); or 2) ownership is crucial for the 
contraction bias (i.e. there is an own-body-size effect) but there was sufficiently high ownership 
in both the synchronous and asynchronous conditions in Experiment 1 so that the contraction 
bias was present in both conditions (explanation 2). 
Explanation 1 would contradict results by Van Der Hoort et al. (2011), Van Der Hoort & 
Ehrsson (2014; 2016), Linkenauger et al. (2013), and Banakou et al. (2013). Furthermore, 
explanation 2 receives support from previous research findings: it has been shown that the mere 
perspective of looking at a body from a 1PP in an IVE leads to strong experiences of ownership. 
For example, Normand et al. (2011) reported that in the asynchronous condition, administered in 
the 1PP, a considerable amount of participants (between 23% and 32%) reported high scores in 
the ownership questionnaire. The role of perspective was also emphasized in various other 
studies (e.g. Kokkinara, Kilteni, Blom, & Slater, 2016; Maselli & Slater, 2013; Petkova, 
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Khoshnevis, & Ehrsson, 2011b; Slater, Spanlang, Sanchez-Vives, & Blanke, 2010). It was noted 
that 1PP “dominates visuotactile synchrony in its contribution towards body ownership illusions” 
(Kilteni, Normand, Sanchez-Vives, & Slater, 2012). Hence, asynchronous visuotactile 
stimulation might not have been able to sufficiently disrupt ownership in Experiment 1. Even 
though we have found a difference of experienced ownership between the synchronous and 
asynchronous conditions, there were still considerably high levels of ownership present in the 
asynchronous condition as indicated by the descriptive statistics of Experiment 1 (see Table 2). It 
is therefore plausible that the contraction bias occurred in both the synchronous and 
asynchronous condition. We therefore administered a second experiment, where we used a 
different visuotactile stimulation aimed at disrupting ownership in the asynchronous condition 
more strongly than in Experiment 1. 
4. Experiment 2 
4.1 Method 
We used the same design and procedure as in Experiment 1 except for the ownership 
manipulation. In addition to the visuotactile stimulation, we now changed the perspective of the 
participants. Therefore, the intention of Experiment 2 was to create an even stronger difference 
between conditions in terms of ownership. In the synchronous condition, participants were 
touched synchronously and had a 1PP view of the virtual body, the same as in Experiment 1. In 
the asynchronous condition, however, participants had a 3PP view of the body (see right side of 
Figure 1). The virtual body was moved to the left by about one time the width of the respective 
avatar’s body. Additionally, the participants could only see the touches being applied to the 
virtual body but they could not feel them on their real body. The reasoning for the absence of 
tactile stimulation was that real touches being applied to seemingly empty virtual space could 
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create confusion in the participants. Additionally, the touches could be associated with the avatar 
body by the participants, even if they were asynchronous. 
4.2 Results 
4.2.1 Ownership and presence. Again, we tested whether the modified stimulation 
procedure (additional perspective change) had worked as intended. Descriptive statistics are 
shown in Table 3. There were significant main effects of stimulation in two-way repeated 
measures ANOVAs for ownership, F(1, 23) = 117.26, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.84, and presence, F(1, 
23) = 30.06, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.57. In both analyses, no significant interactions and main effects of 
body size could be observed. Additionally, we found no significant effects for control questions 
(all p > .05). These results again indicate a successful induction of ownership in the synchronous 
condition (Hypothesis 1). Furthermore, the effect sizes of the main effects of stimulation for 
ownership and presence were both higher than in Experiment 1, suggesting an even stronger 
effect of stimulation. The marginal mean of the ownership ratings in the asynchronous conditions 
(2.36) was now considerably below the middle of the scale (4; see Table 3). 
Again, we asked participants about their impression of the room's size and their own 
perceived age. We found a linear effect of body size for the questions "I felt younger than I 
actually am" (F(1, 23) = 29.66, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.56) and "I felt older than I actually am" (F(1, 
23) = 10.23, p = .004, ηp
2 = 0.31), suggesting that participants felt younger in the small body and 
older in the large body. Similarly, in the small body, the room appeared bigger than in the large 
body, F(1, 23) = 41.13, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.64, and in the large body, the room appeared smaller 
than in the small body, F(1, 23) = 45.35, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.66. 
4.2.2 Size judgments. As in Experiment 1, we tested Hypotheses 2 and 3 using a two-
way repeated measures ANOVA. In line with Hypothesis 2, we found a main effect of body size 
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on size judgments, F(1.56, 35.96) = 21.03, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.48 (degrees of freedom were 
adjusted using Greenhouse-Geisser correction; Figure 4). As in Experiment 1, there was a linear 
trend (p < .001), suggesting that there was an overestimation in the small body and an 
underestimation in the large body compared to the medium body (contraction bias, Hypothesis 
2). However, the interaction did not turn out significant, F(2, 46) = 0.92, p = .405, ηp
2 = 0.04. 
Additionally, we found no main effect of stimulation, F(1, 23) = 0.53, p = .474, ηp
2 = 0.02. See 
Figure 4 for details. Therefore, as in Experiment 1, we could not support Hypothesis 3 (own-
body-size effect). 
4.3 Discussion 
Again, we could show a contraction bias in size judgments. However, the bias was not 
stronger in the synchronous condition compared to the asynchronous condition. Therefore, the 
additional manipulation of perspective did not lead to a stronger own-body-size effect. Altering 
the perspective of the virtual body has already been used in previous studies (e.g. Petkova, 
Björnsdotter, Gentile, Jonsson, & Ehrsson, 2011a). These studies demonstrated considerable 
levels of ownership in conditions with a 1PP (Petkova et al., 2011a; b; Maselli & Slater, 2014). 
We observed lower ownership ratings in the asynchronous 3PP condition in Experiment 2 than in 
the asynchronous 1PP condition of Experiment 1 and there was also a clear difference between 
1PP and 3PP in Experiment 2. Thus, the change in perspective in Experiment 2 successfully 
improved the impact of the ownership manipulation. Nevertheless, there was no effect of 
ownership on size judgments. 
It is still possible that the contraction bias we found in our study reflects an effect of 
visual comparison rather than ownership. This explanation was already addressed and ruled out 
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for the original paradigm in the follow-up studies by Van der Hoort and Ehrsson (2014; 2016). 
To rule out this possibility in our experiments, we administered a third experiment. 
5. Experiment 3 
5.1 Method 
In Experiment 3 we tested whether the removal of the body as a visual reference cue 
during size judgments would negatively affect the contraction bias. The same design and 
procedure as in Experiment 2 was used except that, after the stimulation phase, the virtual avatar 
body was removed and the judgments of the test objects had to be made without the possibility 
of using the body as a visual reference. Therefore, results of Experiment 3 can be attributed more 
closely to the previous manipulation of ownership by ruling out a visual comparison effect 
during the judgment phase. 
5.2 Results 
5.2.1 Ownership and presence. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 4. Again, there 
was a significant main effect of stimulation for ownership, F(1, 19) = 39.98, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.68. 
Ownership was higher in the synchronous condition. There was also a main effect of body size 
for ownership, F(1.95, 37.11) = 4.63, p = .017, ηp
2 = 0.20 (degrees of freedom were adjusted 
using Greenhouse-Geisser correction). Ownership was significantly higher in the normal body 
compared to the large body (p = .014, Tukey adjusted post-hoc tests). There was no significant 
main effect of stimulation for presence, F(1, 19) = 1.39, p = .253, ηp
2 = 0.07. In contrast to 
Experiments 1 and 2, there was an additional significant main effect of stimulation for control 
questions, F(1, 19) = 9.08, p = .007, ηp
2 = 0.32, meaning that statements not related to ownership 
received more support in the synchronous condition. All other effects were not significant (all p 
> .05). These results conflict with the expectations of Hypothesis 1. The fact that there was also a 
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difference between stimulation conditions in the control questions could be due to a response 
bias. Additionally, there was no effect on presence ratings. 
As in the previous experiments, we asked participants about their impression of the 
room's size and their own perceived age. We observed the same effects as in Experiments 1 and 
2 except that participants did not feel significantly older in the large body. There was a linear 
effect of body size for the question "I felt younger than I actually am" (F(1, 19) = 7.31, p = .014, 
ηp
2 = 0.28) but not for the question "I felt older than I actually am" (F(1, 19) = 3.75, p = .068, ηp
2 
= 0.17), suggesting that participants felt younger in the small body but not significantly older in 
the large body. Additionally, in the small body, the room appeared bigger than in the large body, 
F(1, 19) = 47.47, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.71, and in the large body, the room appeared smaller than in 
the small body, F(1, 19) = 61.10, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.76, similar to Experiments 1 and 2. 
5.2.2 Size judgments. As in Experiments 1 and 2, we used a two-way repeated measures 
ANOVA. Again, there was a significant main effect of body size, F(2, 38) = 6.09, p = .005, ηp
2 = 
0.24 (Figure 5). The linear trend (p = .002) showed that there was a contraction bias 
(overestimation of size in the small body and underestimation of size in the large body compared 
to the medium body). Therefore, Hypothesis 2 could be supported using nonvisible bodies in the 
judgment phase. However, as before, Hypothesis 3 (own-body-size effect) received no support: 
There was no interaction between body size and stimulation, F(2, 38) = 1.06, p = .358, ηp
2 = 
0.05, and there was no main effect of stimulation, F(1, 19) = 2.10, p = .164, ηp
2 = 0.10 (Figure 
5). 
5.3 Discussion 
To conclude a full validation study of the own-body-size effect, we administered a 
condition where there was no visible body during the judgment phase. Again, we could show 
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that there was a contraction bias. Since the body could not act as a visual reference during the 
judgment of the objects, it is probable that cognitive aspects associated with the body led to the 
contraction bias. These aspects include ownership but also priming of the previously presented 
body. A direct visual comparison can be ruled out as an explanation for the results since no body 
was visible during the judgment phase. However, it is still possible that participants made a 
mental visual comparison between the objects and their memory of the body. There was no 
instruction to imagine a visual body. Nevertheless, we are unable to rule out this explanation 
completely and further research could clarify the role of mental comparisons (e.g. by changing 
the instructions of the task or asking participants about their strategies). 
As in Experiment 1 and 2, we could not show that the contraction bias depended on the 
stimulation condition. Again, there was a significant difference in the amount of experienced 
ownership as indicated by the questionnaire data. However, surprisingly, although we used the 
same visuotactile stimulation procedure as in Experiment 2, the difference of ownership between 
conditions was descriptively not as pronounced as in Experiments 1 and 2. A possible 
explanation is that we only assessed ownership at the end of each trial, thereby including both 
the ownership induction and the size judgment phase in the subjective ownership rating. 
Participants, in hindsight, might have experienced the judgment phase as having lower 
ownership because there was no body visible during the latter part of the experiment. This could 
have lowered the overall ownership ratings. Nevertheless, we expected a difference between 
stimulation conditions. Another point to consider is that there was a higher agreement with 
control questions in the synchronous condition. Analyses of the control questions showed that 
both received more agreement in the synchronous condition: Participants had a stronger 
impression of having two bodies at the same time and a higher agreement with the statement that 
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the avatar began to visually resemble their own body. A possible explanation is that the removal 
of the avatar after the ownership induction interfered with participants' interpretation of the 
control questions. Potentially, seeing the virtual world alternatingly with and without a virtual 
body could have led to an impression of having two bodies at the same time when the virtual 
body was present and synchronous. Similarly, the body could have appeared visually similar to 
the own body because of the striking difference between having a body and having no body in 
the virtual world. Nevertheless, ownership questions received more support in the synchronous 
condition, indicating that there was still an ownership difference. 
6. General Discussion 
In our study we were able to demonstrate the own-body-size effect in an IVE setting. We 
remained as close as possible to the original setup (Van der Hoort et al., 2011). In Experiment 1 
we used a well-established method of manipulating ownership by applying either synchronous or 
asynchronous touches to virtual bodies. In Experiment 2 we applied either synchronous or no 
touches and manipulated the perspective of the virtual body. We used an approach that was 
inspired by the results of previous VR studies showing that manipulating the perspective in VR 
can be more effective than visuotactile stimulation (e.g. Maselli & Slater, 2013; Petkova et al., 
2011a; b; Slater et al., 2010). In Experiment 3 we ruled out that visual comparison of the virtual 
body and the test objects affected the own-body-size effect. 
In all three experiments, we found a significant contraction bias. However, the 
visuotactile ownership manipulation had no effect. The supposedly stronger manipulation of 
ownership in Experiment 2 did not impact this finding. In addition, the contraction bias was 
observed in Experiment 3 when using invisible bodies in the judgment phase. In sum, we could 
successfully demonstrate the contraction bias in an IVE. Our results support previous findings 
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that suggest an effect of the size of one’s own body on the perception of objects (Banakou et al., 
2013; Linkenauger et al., 2013; Van der Hoort et al., 2011). In all of our experiments, a larger 
body led to an underestimation of object size and a smaller body led to an overestimation. 
However, using an IVE, we could not show an influence of the amount of ownership on the 
strength of the contraction bias. It is possible that other mechanisms hinder the comparability of 
the findings from the virtual and the real world, respectively. For example, as mentioned above, 
distances are systematically underestimated in an IVE (Renner et al., 2013). There were two 
studies that already used an IVE to investigate effects of virtual bodies on object size judgments 
and they could demonstrate that the size of the body affects judgments (Banakou et al., 2013; 
Linkenauger et al., 2013). However, these studies did either not accurately manipulate or 
measure ownership sensations towards the virtual bodies or they did not demonstrate a 
contraction bias but rather a general overestimation of objects for ownership of small bodies. 
Results from these studies did therefore not elucidate how the strength of body ownership is 
associated with the contraction bias in an IVE. The IVE in our experiments elicited a contraction 
bias and therefore affected perception in the same way it was affected in the real world. 
However, the feeling of ownership towards virtual bodies was, although present, not as decisive 
for the perception of the virtual world as expected. This is in contrast to the original proposition 
of the effect by Van der Hoort and colleagues.  
Another explanation for the lacking influence of ownership is that, in VR, only a little 
amount of ownership is needed to induce the contraction bias. We tried to rule out this 
explanation in Experiment 2. We observed larger differences between the stimulation conditions 
in self-reported ownership than in Experiment 1 and ownership was low in the asynchronous 
condition. Therefore, we could confirm that altering the perspective of the body is a promising 
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approach for manipulating ownership in an IVE. However, this manipulation did not affect the 
size judgments. Even a lower amount of ownership was able to produce the contraction bias. 
Possibly, an IVE itself is already convincing the user that she or he is connected to the avatar. 
Users could automatically inherit properties from their virtual manifestations due to the visually 
compelling character of the environment, regardless of the amount of ownership reported in 
questionnaires. This explanation could pose problems for inducing disownership in future VR 
embodiment studies since conditions with low ownership could entail the same behavioral 
consequences as high ownership conditions. Yet another conceivable explanation for our results 
is priming. In all three experiments, priming of the concepts smallness and largeness in the 
ownership phase of the respective conditions could have influenced the size judgments. 
However, this is unlikely the case because we would expect that priming of smallness would lead 
to smaller judgments of objects and vice versa. 
Overall, our results show that caution needs to be taken when transferring embodiment 
studies into VR setups. Visual perception does not necessarily involve exactly the same 
processes in an IVE as in a real environment. It is conceivable that an ownership sensation of a 
virtual body has different properties when compared to an ownership sensation of a physically 
present body-like object. Furthermore, the own-body-size effect could be more fragile than 
previously thought and depend on the characteristics of the ownership manipulation. 
One limitation of our study is that we only used self-reports of ownership and no 
physiological measures (e.g. skin conductance response to a threat). Even though self-reports 
have been used throughout ownership research, physiological measures could still provide a 
more sensitive assessment of ownership and reveal aspects that cannot be captured with self-
reports. However, there are only few studies that specifically address differences between both 
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forms of measurement and they either reported similar effects for both forms of measurement 
(e.g. Palomo et al., 2017) or even a stronger effect for subjective measurements (Rohde, Di Luca, 
& Ernst, 2011). 
To summarize our findings, we showed that the size of the body serves as a reference 
frame for the perception of object size. A visual comparison between the body and the object is 
not responsible for the effect. Furthermore, we could increase the impact of an ownership 
manipulation on perceived ownership by additionally manipulating the perspective. In future 
studies this procedure could be further improved by altering the perspective to a larger degree, so 
that the virtual body is outside of the near-personal space of the participant in order to induce an 
ownership disrupting condition. Additionally, in future studies, other means of manipulating 
ownership in an IVE such as real-time movements of avatars could be considered.  
6.1 Conclusions 
We demonstrated that high levels of ownership need not be a crucial factor for evoking a 
contraction bias in a VR setting. This means that caution is advised when assessing behavioral 
consequences of body ownership in VR, especially regarding perception. Ownership feelings 
need not reflect the entire relationship a user forms to his or her virtual self-representation. Our 
results have implications for potential VR therapies for body disorders such as anorexia nervosa 
or muscle dysmorphia. For example, Keizer, van Elburg, Helms, & Dijkerman (2016) could 
show that it is possible to decrease overestimation of body size in anorexia nervosa patients by 
manipulating the virtual body. Furthermore, in the context of social phobias, the illusion of 
having a large body could be used in the sense of the Proteus effect (Yee & Bailenson, 2007) to 
enhance self-confidence. Regarding body ownership, it has been shown that experiencing 
ownership of avatars is able to modulate pain thresholds (Martini, Perez-Marcos, & Sanchez-
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Vives, 2014) and to reduce racial bias (Maister, Sebanz, Knoblich, & Tsakiris, 2013). The results 
from our study demonstrate the importance of the perspective in eliciting such ownership 
feelings. We can also draw conclusions about VR content development: demonstrably, very large 
or very small virtual body representations are suitable for evoking strong ownership feelings. 
Humans seem to have an astonishingly high tolerance for accepting exotic or impossible bodies 
as their own frame of reference. This enlarges possibilities for game designers to engage users in 
widely different avatars and opens up the possibility to use microrobots in surgery, as van der 
Hoort and colleagues (2011) point out. Our results indicate that it is feasible to experience 
ownership of a small artificial body. However, the contraction bias needs to be taken into 
consideration when performing complex spatio-visual tasks such as surgery. 
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Table 1. 
Overview of the experiments. 
  
Experiment Ownership manipulation Size Judgments 
Experiment 1 Synchronous vs. asynchronous 
touch (both in 1PP) 
Body visible 
Experiment 2 Synchronous touch in 1PP vs. 
asynchronous touch in 3PP 
Body visible 
Experiment 3 Synchronous touch in 1PP vs. 
asynchronous touch in 3PP 
Body not visible 
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Table 2. 
Descriptive statistics for ownership, control, and presence questions in Experiment 1. 
Notes: Displayed are the marginal means for the synchronous and asynchronous stimulation 





Ownership 4.48 3.61 
Control Questions 3.11 3.06 
Presence 3.50 3.17 
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Table 3. 
Descriptive statistics for ownership, control, and presence questions in Experiment 2. 
Notes: Displayed are the marginal means for the synchronous and asynchronous stimulation 





Ownership 4.44 2.36 
Control Questions 2.36 2.14 
Presence 3.53 2.89 
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Table 4. 
Descriptive statistics for ownership, control, and presence questions in Experiment 3. 
Notes: Displayed are the marginal means for the synchronous and asynchronous stimulation 
conditions. N = 60 for all questions 
  




Ownership 4.11 2.98 
Control Questions 2.27 1.98 




Fig. 1 Left side: the three body size conditions in the first-person perspective (used in all 
experiments). Right side: the three body size conditions in the third-person perspective (used 
in the asynchronous conditions in Experiments 2 and 3). Note that the bodies are shown 
from slightly above the participants' actual viewpoint in VR in order to compensate for the 
loss of stereoscopic information and to make size differences more visible. In the 




Fig. 2 a) Virtual replica of the laboratory room. b) Real laboratory room. c) A participant is lying 
on the mattress making size judgments. d) View of the participants during size judgments in 
Experiment 1 (shown is the large body condition). In Experiment 2 the view in the 
asynchronous condition was shifted to the right of the body and in Experiment 3 the body 




Fig. 3 Results of the two-way repeated measures ANOVA with the difference between real and 
estimated size of the test objects as dependent measure (Experiment 1)  
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Fig. 4 Results of the two-way repeated measures ANOVA with the difference between real and 
estimated size of the test objects as dependent measure (Experiment 2)  
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Fig. 5 Results of the two-way repeated measures ANOVA with the difference between real and 





During the experiment, there were times when … 
… I felt as if the avatar's body was my body (ownership). 
… I had the feeling that I was looking at myself (ownership). 
… it seemed as though the touch I felt was caused by the object touching the avatar (ownership). 
… I had the feeling that I was lying in the same location as the avatar (location). 
… I felt I could move the avatar, if I wanted to (agency). 
… I felt as if I had two bodies (control question). 
… the avatar began to resemble my own body in terms of shape, skin tone, or some other visual 
feature (control question). 
Answer scale 
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Abstract 
The velocity of moving stimuli has been linked to their experienced duration. This effect was 
extended to instances of self-motion, where one’s own movement affects the subjective length of 
time. However, the experimental evidence of this extension is scarce and the effect of self-
motion has not been investigated using a reproduction paradigm. Therefore, we designed a 
virtual reality scenario that controls for attention and eliminates the confounding of velocity and 
acceleration. The scenario consisted of a virtual road on which participants (n = 26) moved along 
in a car for six different durations and with six different velocities. We measured the subjective 
duration of the movement with reproduction and direct numerical estimation. We also assessed 
levels of presence in the virtual world. Our results show that faster velocity was connected to 
longer subjective time for both forms of measurement. However, the effect showed deviations 
from linearity. Presence was not associated with subjective time and did not improve 
performance in the task. We interpreted the effect of velocity as corroborating previous work 
using stimulus motion, which showed the same positive association between velocity of 
movement and subjective time. The absence of an effect of presence was explained in terms of a 
lacking dependency of time on characteristics of the virtual environment. We suggest applying 
our findings to the design of virtual experiences intended for inducing time loss. 




The dominant view in time perception research presumes the existence of an internal 
clock (cf. Grondin, 2010). A prominent example is the pacemaker-counter model, according to 
which subjective time is influenced by some form of pacemaker that tracks time by generating 
impulses in regular intervals (Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon et al., 1984; Rammsayer & Ulrich, 2001; 
Treisman, 1963). The state-dependent-network is yet another model which has received support 
in the domains of motor control and visual perception (Eagleman, 2008; Grondin, 2010; 
Karmarkar & Buonomano, 2007). According to this model, time perception is an intrinsic 
process that is based on time-dependent changes in the state of neural activity. There is 
experimental support for either model of time perception (cf. Grondin, 2010; Ivry & Schlerf, 
2008). 
Irrespective of the mechanism, our subjective time apparently is not only depending on 
temporal information but also on unrelated sensory input: for example, the overall magnitude of 
stimuli such as size, luminosity, or motion velocity has been shown to affect the subjective 
estimation of presentation time (Matthews et al., 2011; Rammsayer & Verner, 2014; Xuan et al., 
2007). Brown (1995) reported a linear relationship between the velocity of moving stimuli and 
the subjective length of the duration of their appearance. Higher velocities led to longer 
subjective estimates of presentation times, independent of the actual presentation time, which 
varied from 6 to 18 s. This positive association between stimulus motion velocity and perceived 
duration was subsequently reproduced in several other studies (Gorea, & Kim, 2015; Kaneko, & 
Murakami, 2009; Tomassini et al., 2011). Based on similar findings, Walsh (2003, 2015) 
proposed the ATOM model (A Theory Of Magnitude). The ATOM model postulates a general 
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mechanism for detecting magnitudes across sensory modalities. Specifically, the model assumes 
strong intercorrelations between space, time, and numerosity judgments. 
Surprisingly, only few studies looked at an effect of velocity of one’s own body motion on 
the subjective experience of time. In this study, we suggest a new way to study this effect of self-
motion. We used immersive VR technology to achieve high control over stimulus variables while 
maintaining external validity. We aimed to explore whether velocity of self-motion affects the 
judgment of time in a prospective time judgment task. Self-motion was induced by vection in a 
car-driving task. Participants wore a head-mounted display (HMD) and moved along a virtual 
road leading through a city environment as co-drivers in a car. The velocity of the movement as 
well as its duration were systematically varied. Participants had to express the subjective 
duration of their movement explicitly by numerical estimation and implicitly by reproduction of 
the target duration. Subjective time in immersive virtual environments (IVEs) has applied 
potential in activities where timing is important. 
 
1.1 Motion and Perception of Time 
If motion is actively generated by participants, it is no longer possible to differentiate between 
the effect of self-motion and the motor efforts that require attentional resources. According to 
internal clock models, tasks with higher attentional demand lead to shorter subjective time 
because there are fewer resources available to keep track of timing pulses (cf. Brown, 2008). 
Studies that engaged participants in stationary physical exercise (either on a treadmill or on an 
ergometer) found an underestimation of time compared to control conditions without exercise 
(Kroger-Costa et al., 2013; Vercruyssen et al., 1989). However, in these studies the (active) self-
motion is confounded with the exercise: Similar to a dual-task paradigm, attentional resources 
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are captured by the exercising task and are thus not fully available for the timing task. It is our 
goal to overcome this limitation and to ensure that the above-mentioned results are indeed the 
result of self-motion. Therefore, participants in our study experienced passive self-motion. 
Only few studies used passive self-motion to investigate the effect of motion velocity on 
time perception. Participants were moved on rotating devices in the dark and had to produce time 
intervals by regularly tapping a button while being moved (Binetti et al., 2010; Capelli et al., 
2007). Tapping rate was higher in accelerated motion trials. These studies indicated that with 
increasing acceleration the subjective time estimation seems to shorten (i.e. there is an 
underestimation of time in fast acceleration). This seems to contradict the effects of visually 
induced motion via stimuli, where increased motion velocity led to an overestimation of time. It 
is possible that faster passive acceleration required more attentional resources than slower 
acceleration or no motion (Capelli et al., 2007). Ramped up movements could be more 
demanding for participants and require more attention to sensory input during self-motion. 
Therefore, it is possible that ramped up movements capture attentional resources and, thus, lead 
to shorter produced time intervals. In these experiments, participants were blindfolded, which 
means that any effect of motion can only be attributed to vestibular perception. Additionally, the 
vestibular system can only detect changes in velocity, and this limits the possibilities of 
investigating self-motion at constant velocity. Furthermore, the mean velocity of motion was 
confounded with the length of the acceleration and deceleration phase. While there is certainly an 
interest in studying real passive movement, the duration needed for accelerating or decelerating 
cannot be discerned from the effect of constant velocity when only short real passive 
displacements are applied. 
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In Brehmer’s study (1970), participants were co-drivers in a car on the highway. While 
looking forward through the front window, they had to produce intervals that were multiples of 
the length of previously introduced time intervals (magnitude production paradigm). For 
example, if they were introduced to a 10 s interval before entering the car and then, while 
moving on the highway, the experimenter asked for an interval of twice the length of the 
standard interval, they had to produce a 20 s interval. When the car was going faster (i.e. driving 
100 kph instead of 50 kph), they produced longer intervals. Although attention was effectively 
held constant and trials were long enough to limit the influence of acceleration and deceleration 
phases, there are still problems associated with the magnitude production paradigm. It has been 
argued that humans are not capable of making accurate quantitative judgments on a ratio scale, 
as it is necessary in magnitude production (cf. Narens, 1996). Investigations by Ellermeier and 
Faulhammer (2000) and Zimmer (2005) showed that this objection was corroborated and they 
concluded that participants are unable to produce accurate quantities. 
Van Rijn (2014) showed participants a video of a virtual car moving on a road. The video 
was either sped up or slowed down to create trials with differing motion velocity. The reference 
velocity was 100 kph and there were additional trials with 50, 75, 125, and 150 kph. A magnitude 
comparison paradigm was chosen for judging time. Participants were first introduced to a 
standard duration and, later, had to compare each trial to this standard duration. The intended 
differences between the standard duration and the trial durations were in the range of -0.2 to +0.2 
seconds. The result was that an overestimation of time was present in the higher velocity 
conditions, whereas an underestimation could be observed in lower velocities. This positive 
effect of velocity resembles the effect of stimulus motion on subjective time. The study had a 
high validity and effectively controlled for effects of attention and acceleration. One limitation of 
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the experiment is, however, that only time differences within the subsecond range were 
presented. Interestingly, Brown (1995) also found an overestimation for faster motion and for 
moving stimuli. In this case, however, vection induced from the moving surroundings of the car 
was responsible for the effect. 
Taken together, there were mixed results about the effect of self-motion velocity on time 
perception. Some studies contradict the results of stimulus motion and found that fast passive 
self-motion led to an underestimation of time, while others support the results of stimulus motion 
and found an overestimation. This discrepancy can be explained with differences in study design: 
If attention was held constant, faster motion led to an overestimation of time (Brehmer, 1970; 
van Rijn, 2014). We propose that self-motion after controlling for attention will produce similar 
results as those found in studies using visual stimulus motion: faster motion leads to longer 
subjective time judgments. Furthermore, we propose that this relationship is linear. Therefore, we 
state the following two hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Higher target velocities are associated with longer subjective durations and 
lower target velocities are associated with shorter subjective durations. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The effect of target velocity on subjective duration is linear. 
 
An important limitation of previous research about the effect of self-motion on subjective 
time is that time perception was measured using different paradigms. None of these paradigms 
involved an explicit measure of time experience. Additionally, there was no study that applied a 
reproduction paradigm. Reproduction is one of the standard paradigms in time perception 
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research (Grondin, 2010). Reproduction methods show less inter-subject variability and are less 
dependent on socially learned time units than other forms of measurements such as production of 
time and verbal reports, according to Rammsayer and Verner (2014). The same authors argue that 
time reproduction is the preferred method to investigate effects on prospective time perception 
since it represents a ‘natural’ form of measurement. Accordingly, we will include reproduction 
measures in our study. 
A second addition of our study is the use of immersive VR technology. We propose that a 
VR paradigm will help to isolate the effect of self-motion velocity on time perception and 
enhance external validity: VR allows to control for effects of attention since neither motor effort 
nor ramp-up phases are required. Furthermore, it allows stricter control over the surroundings 
than real world scenarios (Loomis et al., 1999). At the same time, it imitates real life situations 
and provides high external validity. IVEs possess a range of additional depth cues and more 
realistic motion than 2D environments (Armbrüster et al., 2008). 
Taken together, our study combines and extends the experiments by Brehmer (1970) and 
van Rijn (2014). It connects realistic car motion from a first person point of view with the 
possibilities of generating true constant velocity trials. We are the first to use a VR paradigm for 
assessing the effect of self-motion on subjective time. We are also the first to use reproduction 
for assessing subjective time in the context of self-motion. Finally, another addition of our 
experiment is the assessment of presence as described in the next section. 
 
1.2 Presence and Perception of Time 
Presence is the degree to which one feels immersed, or present, in a virtual world. It is often 
defined in the literature as the feeling of being physically present in a technically mediated 
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environment (Steuer, 1992; Weibel et al., 2011; Wissmath et al., 2010). Presence has already 
been linked to time perception in games. Empirical studies found that a high level of presence 
was related to greater time loss (Hägni et al., 2007; Sanders & Cairns, 2010; Wood et al., 2007). 
In contrast, Nordin (2014) did not find a link between presence and time perception. Yet other 
findings suggest that presence could enhance distance perception in a virtual world (Interrante et 
al., 2006; Ries et al., 2008; Mohler et al., 2008). It is therefore possible that presence could also 
enhance time perception in VR. However, to our knowledge, there is no empirical study that 
addressed this idea. Considering the mixed results in gaming studies and the lack of knowledge 
about the relationship between presence and time perception, we wanted to include measures of 
presence in our study and look at possible beneficial effects of presence on time perception. 
Therefore, we are the first to combine the effect of self-motion velocity on time perception with 
measures of presence. Insights into this relationship allow us to assess how presence in a virtual 
world is connected to the perception of time and if presence can contribute to an improved 




We recruited 26 participants, of which ten were male (age: M = 21.3 years, SD = 2.1 years) and sixteen were female 
(age: M = 21.1 years, SD = 1.9 years). All participants had normal or corrected to normal vision. Four participants 
(15.4%) reported having prior experience with HMDs. Sixteen participants (62%) were in possession of a driving 
license. 
Participants were students from the University of Bern and received course credit in exchange to their participation. 
They provided written informed consent about taking part prior to the experiment and were debriefed after the 
experiment. They were treated in accordance with the Code of Ethics of the World Medical Association (Declaration 
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of Helsinki) and the study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Human Sciences at the 
University of Bern. 
 
2.2 Design and Material 
The driving task consisted of six different temporal intervals (2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 s) and five different velocities (5, 
30, 60, 120, and 240 kph) as well as a no motion condition (0 kph). This resulted in 36 combinations of time and 
velocity, each of which was realized once, resulting in 36 trials per participant. The trials were presented in random 
order. 
The dependent measures in the driving task were the time estimations (numerical estimation or 
reproduction, see procedure section for details), velocity, and distance estimations (both via visual analog scales). 
We also obtained presence and confidence ratings by using questionnaires. Confidence was assessed with a single 
item on an analog scale (“How confident are you about the correctness of your time judgments?”). For presence 
ratings the Pictorial Presence SAM (Weibel et al., 2015) and a questionnaire by Dinh et al. (1999) were used. The 
SAM consists of six sequences of five pictograms. The sequences represent different aspects of presence and the 
corresponding pictograms depict the intensity levels of presence. For each sequence, one of the pictograms that best 
fits the participants’ subjective level of presence has to be chosen. The answer is then transformed into a number 
from one to five. The Dinh et al. questionnaire is comprised of ten questions that are accompanied by a Likert scale 
with five answer categories (1 = poor, 5 = excellent). Additionally, participants have to indicate their subjective 
level of presence with a number from 1 to 100, where 1 means having absolutely no presence at all and 100 means 
having as much presence as in the real world. The internal consistency of both presence scales was sufficiently high 
(Dinh et al. scale: Cronbach’s Alpha = .82; SAM: Cronbach’s Alpha = .74). 
The virtual world was a long straight street, leading from a rural area into a city. There were no other cars 
in traffic and no human avatars on the sidewalk. The virtual model was provided by Esri Inc. (Redlands, United 
States) and used with permission. The experiment was run on the Vizard platform (WorldViz LLC., Santa Barbara, 
United States). The participants were seated on the co-driver’s seat of a virtual car and they were facing forward. 
Apart from a steering wheel that was placed on the table next to the participants (Logitech G27, Logitech 
international S.A., Apples, Switzerland), no other props were used to emulate the virtual world in the laboratory 
room. Next to them was an avatar that appeared to drive the car. The participants themselves did not have a visible 
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virtual body. During driving, sound effects of the inside of a car on the highway were played. The sounds were not 
matched to velocity and were the same in all conditions. Remarks of participants in pilot trials of the experiment 
indicated that this was not experienced as disturbing for the feeling of presence. Participants wore an Oculus Rift 
HMD (Oculus VR, LLC., Irvine, United States) and provided inputs by means of an Oculus Remote controller. 
 
2.3 Procedure 
After a short explanation of the task and the handling of the controller, participants put on the HMD and familiarized 
themselves with the virtual car interior. When they were ready, the experimenter started the task. Participants could 
from now on start a trial by pushing a button. In each trial, the car moved along the road with a certain velocity and 
duration. When the time limit was reached, the HMD screen turned black and the interior car sound effect ceased 
playing. Immediately afterwards participants reproduced the target duration by pressing a dedicated button on the 
controller once for beginning the reproduction interval and once for stopping it. There was a short auditory feedback 
whenever the button was pressed. The participants were instructed to reproduce the duration from the beginning of 
the car motion until the fade out of the screen. After the reproduction, participants were presented with a series of 
input screens, where they had to give an estimate of the duration, velocity and traveled distance of the car ride. The 
numerical time estimation had to be given by choosing a value from a list with a range of 1 to 9 s in intervals of 0.5 
s. Participants were advised to rely on their feeling of time. The other estimates were given on visual analog scales 
reaching from 0 to 300 kph (velocity), and 0 to 600 m (distance). Throughout the reproduction and judgment phase, 
the background remained black and only input screens were visible. After finishing the estimates, the participants 
found themselves back in the car at the same starting position as before. They were now able to start the next trial. 
After half of the trials, participants were given the chance for a short break. At the end of the last trial, they had to 
give a self-evaluation of their performance in the time reproduction task (see design and material section above). 
Hereby the visual analog scale ranged from 0% confidence to 100% confidence. At the end of the task, participants 




Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables are depicted in Table 1. Overall, target 
durations were underestimated with numerical estimation and reproduction as dependent 
measure. Both measures were positively correlated, r(930) = .58, p < .001. We observed a 
response bias resembling the Vierordt’s law (Woodrow, 1951): Shorter durations were 
overestimated and longer durations were underestimated in comparison to the overall subjective 
mean estimation error (see Fig. 1). Overall, target velocities were underestimated, only the 5 and 
30 km/h target velocities were slightly overestimated (see Fig. 2). Distances were generally 
overestimated, except for the three longest distances, which were underestimated (see Fig. 3). 
Time judgments were positively associated with velocity judgments (numerical estimation: 
r(930) = .26, p < .001; reproduction: r(930) = .14, p < .001) as well as with distance judgments 
(numerical estimation: r(930) = .33, p < .001; reproduction: r(930) = .25, p < .001). Adjustments 
using Bonferroni’s method and bootstrapping (1000 samples) were performed in order to obtain 
values of significance. Furthermore, we obtained similar levels of presence as in previous studies 
(Dinh et al., 1999; Hendrix & Barfield, 1996a; 1996b; Weibel et al., 2015; Wissmath et al., 
2010). 
To obtain measures of subjective time relative to elapsed time, we calculated the ratio of 
estimated or reproduced duration divided by the target duration, for each trial. We refer to this 
measure as subjective duration. A resulting value of one means that the target time was judged 
accurately, a value above one that time was overestimated, and a value below one that time was 
underestimated. We found a positive relationship between target velocity and subjective duration 
for numerical estimation (rτ = .14, p < .001; Fig. 4) and reproduction (rτ = .08, p = .001; Fig. 5). 
This was in accordance with Hypothesis 1: higher target velocities were associated with longer 
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subjective time. To assess the linearity of the effect of velocity (Hypothesis 2), we implemented a 
linear contrast analysis that was adjusted for the unequal spacing of target velocities. The linear 
contrast was significant for both numerical estimation (F = 51.24, p < .001) and reproduction (F 
= 31.41, p < .001), supporting Hypothesis 2. 
In addition to measures of association, we calculated a multilevel model with target 
velocity as a factor and target duration as a linear predictor to adjust for both the factorial structure 
and the nested layering of the data (cf. Goldstein, 2011; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). We included 
participants as a second-level variable and used it to specify a random intercept and a random 
coefficient for the factor target velocity. The dependent variable was the subjective duration in 
terms of numerical estimation and reproduction. The analysis was performed with the mixed 
function from the afex package in R, using maximum likelihood estimation (Singmann et al., 2015). 
We observed a significant main effect of target velocity on numerical estimation, χ2(5) = 23.10, p 
< .001, and reproduction, χ2(5) = 16.20, p = .006. Faster velocity conditions elicited longer 
subjective time ratings than slow velocity conditions. This was, again, in accordance with 
Hypothesis 1. There was also a negative effect of target duration on numerical estimation, b = -
0.022, SE = 0.003, p < 0.001, and reproduction, b = -0.036, SE = 0.004, p < 0.001. In both cases, 
there was no significant interaction between target duration and velocity (both p > .05). To again 
test for the linearity of the effect of target velocity, a model comparison between the above model 
where velocity was entered as a factorial variable and an additional model where it was entered as 
a continuous variable was initiated. The model with the continuous variable did not improve model 
fit (numerical estimation: χ2(26) = 10.08, p = .998; reproduction: χ2(26) = 34.63, p = .120). Thus, 
the linearity assumption received no support in the multilevel analysis. This conflicts with 
Hypothesis 2. 
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Taken together, the results were in accordance with Hypothesis 1 and partly in support of 
Hypothesis 2. There was a linear relationship between target velocity and subjective time in the 
association measures. Additionally, there was a positive but non-linear relationship between target 
velocity and subjective time in the multilevel analysis, which adjusted for the nested factorial 
structure of the data. Figures 4 and 5 show that the fitted curves decline in the two highest velocity 
conditions, indicating possible deviations from linearity. 
To test our assumptions about presence, we analyzed the associations between presence 
ratings and time judgments. Adjustments using Bonferroni’s method and bootstrapping (1000 
samples) were performed in order to obtain values of significance. There was no correlation 
between presence and mean subjective time in numerical estimation (Dinh et al. scale: r(24) = 
-.22, p = .541; SAM: r(24) = -.04, p = 1) and reproduction (Dinh et al. scale: r(24) = .12, p = 1; 
SAM: r(24) = -.03, p = 1). This means that the individual level of presence was associated with 
neither overestimation nor underestimation of time compared to the overall mean estimation of 
the sample. To test if presence was connected to performance in time judgments, we needed to 
calculate the accuracy of time judgments. Accuracy was defined as the absolute difference 
between target duration and numerical estimation or reproduction. Presence was not associated 
with accuracy in numerical estimation (Dinh et al. scale: r(24) = .09, p = 1; SAM: r(24) = -.13, p 
= 1) and reproduction (Dinh et al. scale: r(24) = .12, p = 1; SAM: r(24) = .15, p = .919). Presence 
ratings were also not associated with accuracy in velocity and distance judgments (all p > .05). 
Interestingly, presence ratings were also not associated with confidence ratings (Dinh et al. scale: 
r(24) = .09, p = .657; SAM: r(24) = .27, p = .184). Furthermore, confidence ratings did not show 
associations with accuracy of time judgments (numerical estimation: r(24) = -.17, p = .420; 
reproduction, r(24) = -.02, p = .930). The maximally observed power for these analyses was 
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0.31. The results did not support our proposition: higher levels of presence did not lead to better 
performance in the time judgment task. 
 
4. Discussion 
In this experiment, we tested whether the velocity of one’s own body motion influenced 
the perception of time. The results showed longer time judgments in conditions with high 
velocities compared to conditions with low velocities. This confirms the effect of self-motion on 
time judgment as reported by Brehmer (1970) and van Rijn (2014). The subjective duration of 
self-motion trials increased with each increase in velocity. However, contrary to our 
expectations, this increase is not linear. A linear effect of velocity was reported in studies using 
stimulus motion (Brown, 1995; Tomassini, et al., 2011). The multilevel analysis suggests 
deviations from a linear effect of velocity. Especially the effects of the two high velocity 
conditions (120 and 240 kph) were not as pronounced as expected. This is in line with the study 
by van Rijn (2014), in which the fast self-motion condition was weaker compared to what would 
be expected from a linear prediction. The data by Brehmer (1970) were not suitable for testing a 
linear effect of velocity. At this point, we have no explanation why self-motion does not elicit the 
same linear effect as stimulus motion and whether linearity is always absent in the effect of self-
motion. Future studies using self-motion paradigms are needed to provide answers to these 
questions. Apart from the linearity assumption, we were able to demonstrate a monotonic 
positive relationship between self-motion velocity and subjective time, thereby confirming 
previous work. Not only the observation of fast moving stimuli leads to longer time judgments 
but also the overall motion of the surroundings from a first-person perspective. These results are 
in accordance with the assumption that subjective time can be affected by sensory input. 
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Specifically, the faster the virtual surroundings changed, the longer was the subjective 
impression of time. This could be explained by an internal clock model in which the timekeeper 
mechanism is accelerated by sensory input. A state-dependent-network model could also serve as 
an explanation. Fast changes in visual input correspond to large changes in activation patterns, 
which in turn lead to a lengthening of subjective time. Roseboom et al. (2019) proposed yet 
another mechanism according to which subjective time is explained in terms of changes in 
perceptual content. In this model, no internal clock or activation pattern is necessary. Instead, 
changes in visual content directly lead to temporal information that can be used to provide a 
subjective duration judgment. In our experiment, this would imply that the speed of a trial was 
effectively equal to the rate of change in visual content, which could be detected by the visual 
system and transformed into a behavioral response. 
It has been argued in the literature (e.g. Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008; Lambrechts et al., 
2013, Riemer et al., 2018) that there is an asymmetric relationship between time and space 
judgments: space perception strongly influences time perception but not necessarily vice versa. 
In our experiment, there was an overall underestimation of time and velocity but an overall 
overestimation of distance. Thus, the judgments of the participants seemingly conflicted with 
physics (if time is shorter and velocity is lower, then also distance is by necessity shorter). 
Nonetheless, there was a significant positive relationship between time and distance judgments, 
suggesting that time judgments could indeed be influenced by distance judgments. With our 
experimental setup, it is not possible to assess the direction of causality and to decide whether 
space perception influenced time perception more strongly than vice versa. Interestingly, 
however, the supposed violation of physical laws seems to be based on the fact that there was 
also a positive correlation between time and velocity judgments. This suggests that – contrary to 
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physics – higher velocity judgments were connected to longer time judgments. Therefore, the 
suggested coupling of magnitudes in our experiment was not consistent with real life, which 
challenges the assumptions of the ATOM model. 
We used an IVE to control the attentional demand between moving and non-moving 
conditions and maintain a high level of external validity. Furthermore, we could implement 
motion without any motor effort or ramp-up phase. Additionally, we extended previous findings 
to explicit measures of time and time reproduction. Both measures were influenced in the same 
way by velocity of self-motion as shown earlier by magnitude production (Brehmer, 1970) and 
magnitude comparison (van Rijn, 2014). Thus, self-motion velocity does indeed affect our 
subjective impression of time. Our experiment is the first demonstration in which a VR setup 
was used to induce self-motion in a time perception task and we could therefore demonstrate that 
the effect is also applicable to immersive virtual worlds and thus computer games. 
Furthermore, we proposed that the presence level could affect performance in the time 
judgment task. However, this proposition was not supported: presence was not associated with 
performance in the time judgment task and no relation between presence and confidence ratings 
was observed. We also did not observe a general decline in the magnitude of time judgments 
with increasing levels of presence. Since aggregated data were used to assess these relationships, 
statistical power was low due to the small number of data points in the aggregated variables (n = 
26, i.e. number of participants). Thus, we can only rule out a strong effect of presence on 
performance in our data. Previous findings reported a beneficial effect of presence on spatial 
perception (cf. Interrante et al., 2006; Ries et al., 2008; Mohler et al., 2008). However, there 
could be no such effect or a smaller effect for temporal perception. The flow of time is 
potentially the same in the real world and IVEs whereas there are substantial differences in the 
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configuration of space (resolution, extent of details, field of view, etc.). Thus, the level of 
presence did not play a significant role in the prospective judgment of time intervals in an IVE. 
Nevertheless, it is also possible that the connection between presence and the judgment of visual 
characteristics (i.e. distances) is simply stronger than the connection between presence and the 
judgment of temporal characteristics. Another possibility is that presence plays a minor role for 
the judgment of short intervals and only affects subjective time on a larger scale. 
There is one limitation to consider in our experiment: the amount of visual information of 
a trial is confounded with its target duration and velocity. For example, in long and fast trials, 
participants saw more aspects of the virtual world than in short and slow trials (i.e. buildings and 
street crossings). This limitation also applies to previous studies of self-motion. To distinguish 
between the amount and velocity of visual information in future studies, we suggest inducing 
basic optic flow in VR environments. For example, dot clouds could be used to hold the amount 
of unique visual information constant while manipulating the velocity of the dots. We 
implemented an immersive environment in our study in order to remain close to real life driving 
situations. 
Results from this study have clinical and practical implications. For example, insights 
into the relationship between motion and subjective time could support the design of serious 
games intended for reducing the subjective duration of unpleasant experiences such as dental 
operations or prolonged periods of waiting. For instance, our results show that, surprisingly, fast-
paced racing games could be less efficient in inducing time loss. Additionally, our results show 
that the design of windows on long-distance flights or train rides could affect the subjective 
duration of the journey: subjective time is affected by motion of the surroundings. Conceivably, 
virtual displays could be used to affect the subjective time experience. Another application is the 
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subjective perception of speed in real-life driving. We showed that fast driving resulted in an 
overestimation of time. Potentially, drivers are tempted to exceed the speed limit in zones with 
an already high limit, in order to compensate for the subjective longer duration (cf. van Rijn, 
2014). 
To sum up, our findings show that increased velocity of self-motion induced by vection, 
leads to an overestimation of short time intervals. This was true for both measurements, 
reproduction and direct numerical estimation. The amount of presence experienced in the virtual 
world did not influence the magnitude of time judgments or the accuracy of time judgments. 
Unlike the perception of space, the flow of time depends less on the characteristics of the virtual 
world, and thus, there was no effect of presence on time perception in VR. 
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Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables 
Variable Minimum Maximum M SD 
Numerical estimation of time -6000 ms 4000 ms -794 ms 1414 ms 
Reproduction of time -6756 ms 4494 ms -812 ms 1204 ms 
Estimation of velocity -215 kph 180 kph -21 kph 52 kph 
Estimation of distance -400 m 367 m 33 m 78 m 
Self-confidence rating 10.45% 86.93% 53.64% 18.97% 
Presence SAM 2.83 4.50 3.53 0.44 
Presence Dinh et al. subjective 20% 95% 51.15% 21.86% 
Presence Dinh et al. scale 1.70 4.00 2.84 0.57 





Figure 1. Panel a) shows the numerical time estimation error and panel b) the time reproduction 
error as a function of target time. Both measures are defined as the difference between target 
time and estimated time. Red dotted lines indicate veridical judgments 
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Figure 2. Velocity estimation error as a function of target velocity. Velocity estimation error is 
defined as the difference between target velocity and estimated velocity. The red dotted 
horizontal line indicates veridicality 
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Figure 3. Distance estimation error as a function of target distance. Distance estimation error is 
defined as the difference between target distance and estimated distance. The target distances 
result from all possible combinations of target times and target velocities. Distances are therefore 
pictured as a continuous variable. The red dotted horizontal line indicates veridicality. The blue 




Figure 4. Relationship between target velocity and subjective duration for numerical estimation. 
Subjective duration is calculated by dividing the estimated value by target time. Therefore, 
values above one indicate overestimation and values below one indicate underestimation. The 
dotted red line indicates veridical judgment. The blue line expresses the relationship between the 




Figure 5. Relationship between target velocity and subjective duration for reproduction. 
Subjective duration is calculated by dividing the estimated value by target time. Therefore, 
values above one indicate overestimation and values below one indicate underestimation. The 
dotted red line indicates veridical judgment. The blue line expresses the relationship between the 
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Abstract 
Previous research suggests that the sense of being immersed in computer games is 
beneficial for recovering from episodes of stress and leads to improved mood states. So far, 
however, no study linked explicit measures of presence – the individual experience of immersion 
– to mood enhancement. In our experiment, we varied the degree of immersion in a gaming 
activity and measured individual levels of presence and enjoyment in order to connect them to 
measures of mood repair after a stress-induction. The participants (N = 77) either played a game 
in virtual reality (VR; high immersion condition), in a desktop setting (medium immersion 
condition), or they watched a recording of the game (low immersion condition). Positive 
emotions were enhanced in the high and medium, but not in the low immersion condition. 
Individual presence was a significant predictor in the VR condition only. Furthermore, presence 
and mood repair were positively associated with enjoyment. An explanatory mediation analysis 
showed that enjoyment mediated the effect of presence on mood repair in positive emotions. 
These findings demonstrate positive effects of presence experiences in gaming for the 
improvement of mood. Experiencing strong presence in a VR game seems especially helpful for 
enhancing mood and building up positive emotional resources. 




In recent years, research about media use – especially gaming – has shifted its focus 
towards the investigation of positive effects (cf. Reinecke & Eden, 2016). A case in point is  
mood improvement. A number of authors suggest that interactive elements and high 
immersiveness of a computer game positively affect mood and may help to recover from work-
related stress and strain (Bowman & Tamborini, 2012; 2015; Reinecke, Klatt, & Krämer, 2011; 
Rieger, Frischlich, Wulf, Bente, & Kneer, 2015). Interactivity and immersion are closely linked 
to presence – the feeling of being there in a mediated environment (Steuer, 1992; Witmer & 
Singer, 1998; Wissmath, Weibel, Schmutz, & Mast, 2011). Presence is often used synonymously 
with immersion (cf. McMahan, 2003). However, unlike interactivity and immersion, presence is 
a clearly defined term and is widely used in virtual reality (VR) and gaming research (cf. 
McMahan, 2003). As mentioned, it is believed that immersing oneself in the world of a computer 
game can have a positive effect on one's mood. Surprisingly, however, the role of presence has 
not yet been investigated in the context of mood repair and gaming. The present study aims to 
close this gap. 
Presence has been described as mediated contents being experienced as real and one’s 
self-awareness being immersed into another world (Draper, Kaber, & Usher, 1998). According to 
Lombard and Ditton (1997), presence is a perceptual illusion of non-mediation. Following a 
proposition by Slater and Wilbur (1997), the term presence is separated from immersion in more 
recent literature (Cummings & Bailenson, 2015; Hein, Mai, & Hußmann, 2018; Wu, Gomes, 
Fernandes, & Wang, 2018). Immersion is based on technical properties of the system and is 
objectively quantifiable. Presence, however, is the individual psychological response to the 
properties of the system (Norman, 2010; Wirth et al., 2007; Witmer & Singer, 1998). Empirical 
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findings show that presence is indeed modulated by individual expectations and personality traits 
(Bucolo, 2004; Weibel, Wissmath, & Mast, 2010; 2011a; 2011b). We will follow this distinction 
henceforth in this article by examining the influence of immersion (the characteristic of a 
computer game) as well as presence (the individual experience of immersion). 
According to Reinecke (2009a; 2009b), the immersive experience (i.e. presence) is a key 
factor that accounts for the recovery experience of computer games. Recovery is a concept from 
organizational psychology and describes the renewal of depleted physical and psychological 
resources after phases of stress and strain (Sonnentag & Fritz, 2007; Sonnentag & Zijlstra, 2006). 
Sonnentag and Fritz (2007) proposed four central aspects of successful recovery: Psychological 
detachment (mental disengagement from work-related stress), relaxation (deactivation of arousal 
and increased positive affect), mastery (building up new internal resources through challenging 
experiences and learning opportunities), and control (increased self-efficacy and feelings of 
competence through experiencing personal control). The results of Reinecke (2009a; 2009b) 
suggest that presence goes along with psychological detachment, which contributes to the 
recovery experience of gaming activity. Additionally, entertaining media are an ideal way to stop 
negative cognitions and preventing episodes of rumination by letting their users immerse in the 
mediated environment. This is in line with Tamborini and Skalski (2006) who suggest that 
playing computer games requires the full attention of the player and strongly binds cognitive 
capacities to the screen, what in turn leads to a highly immersive experience. Games also often 
require taking over new roles (Bessière, Seay, & Kiesler, 2007) and experiencing fictional 
worlds (Yee, 2006). They provide opportunities to control the progress of events or characters 
(Klimmt & Hartmann, 2006) and to experience feelings of autonomy, challenge, and competition 
(Klimmt & Hartmann, 2006; Ryan, Rigby, & Przybylski, 2006). Thus, computer games 
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contribute to all four aspects of successful recovery and are likely to enhance mood and support 
recovery form stress and strain (Collins & Cox, 2014; Reinecke, 2009a; 2009b; Reinecke et al., 
2011). 
Empirical investigations into the role of computer games in recovery are provided by 
three correlational online studies. In two studies by Reinecke (2009a; 2009b), levels of work-
related fatigue and exposure to daily hassles were positively related to the use of games for 
recovery. Thus, participants who associated playing games with recovery played more 
extensively after stressful events. In addition, Collins and Cox (2014) found a relation between 
the amount of gaming activity and recovery from work-related stress. 
In experimental studies, interactivity was manipulated by comparing active gaming with 
watching gameplay recordings and videos. There is no consensus about the definition of 
interactivity (cf. Smuts, 2009), but the respective authors focused on “active participation of the 
player” and having “control over the progress” of the game (Collins, Cox, Wilcock, & Sethu-
Jones, 2019; Reinecke et al., 2011). As such, interactivity shares strong similarities with the 
immersion of games. In these experiments, interactivity has been shown to play a crucial role in 
recovery. Recovery in turn was shown to affect other measures such as cognitive performance 
(Reinecke et al., 2011) and enjoyment (Reinecke et al., 2011; Tamborini, Bowman, Eden, 
Grizzard, & Organ, 2010; Tamborini et al., 2011). In the study by Reinecke and colleagues 
(2011), a repetitive and tedious working task was used to induce a need for recovery. Participants 
were then assigned to one of four conditions that varied in interactivity (video game, recording of 
a video game, an animated video clip, and a control condition). The degree of interactivity of the 
condition positively affected the involvement in the game. Involvement was measured with the 
involvement subscale of the presence-questionnaire by Witmer and Singer (1998). Therefore, 
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involvement is part of the presence experience as defined by Witmer and Singer. Involvement 
was positively associated with recovery, which in turn was positively associated with enjoyment. 
In a recent study, Collins et al. (2019) found that only a digital game condition could improve 
recovery as opposed to a mindfulness app and a non-media condition. Tamborini et al. (2010; 
2011) showed that recovery through gaming was positively associated with enjoyment. Recovery 
in these studies was operationalized with need satisfaction (cf. Reinecke et al., 2011). Taken 
together, previous research on recovery from work-related stress has demonstrated that 
interactivity, and thus also likely immersion, supports recovery and that feelings of presence and 
enjoyment could serve as important individual enhancing factors for successful recovery. 
However, the different contributions of a game’s immersion and the individual presence 
experience have not been worked out so far. 
Instead of recovery from work-related stress, yet other studies used mood repair as a 
measure of the immediate effect of gaming on current mood. This approach is mainly inspired by 
mood management theory (Zillmann, 2000). Mood management assumes that individuals seek to 
avert negative mood and maximize positive mood by selecting appropriate media (Bryant & 
Zillmann, 1984; Knobloch & Zillmann, 2002; Mastro, Eastin, & Tamborini, 2002). Thus, mood 
repair is defined as the change in positive and negative mood after an intervention to regain an 
“optimal” state of mood (Bowman & Tamborini, 2012, p. 1339). In two studies by Bowman and 
Tamborini (2012; 2015), the task demand of a computer game was manipulated in order to 
influence mood repair (task demand is similar to the concept of interactivity, according to the 
authors). The results of both studies showed a curvilinear effect of task demand on mood repair, 
meaning that a medium level of task demand was evoking the strongest mood repair (Bowman & 
Tamborini, 2012; 2015). In a study by Rieger et al. (2015), high interactivity (i.e. gaming 
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compared to watching a recording of the game and a control condition) was positively associated 
with mood repair. Positive emotions generally increased across conditions, whereas negative 
emotions only decreased in the highly interactive condition. The same result was previously 
obtained in a study by Chen and Raney (2009). 
Even though immersive experiences were postulated to affect mood and recovery and 
related concepts such as involvement, interactivity, or task demand were empirically 
investigated, there is a lack of studies that differentiate between immersion and presence. 
Particularly, there is a lack of studies that specifically link subjective immersion in the sense of 
presence (being there in a mediated environment; Steuer, 1992) with mood repair or recovery 
after playing video games. Presence is of great importance in virtual reality (VR) research as a 
VR display completely surrounds the user with another world as opposed to a desktop display 
that provides a discontinuity between the screen and the user in front of the screen (Slater & 
Wilbur, 1997) According to Steuer (1992), presence is the underlying concept of VR. Thus, it is 
important to include VR conditions in the study of stress recovery and mood repair in order to 
understand the impact of presence. However, surprisingly, no study so far has manipulated 
presence with a VR gaming condition. 
A few studies have assessed presence in the context of relaxation tasks in a nature setting 
specifically designed to induce stress recovery or restoration (e.g. de Kort, Meijnders, 
Sponselee, & IJsselsteijn, 2006; Sponselee, de Kort, & Meijnders, 2004). Restoration was 
defined as renewing resources, enhancing the ability to focus one’s attention, reducing stress, and 
promoting positive affect (cf. de Kort et al., 2006). These studies show a beneficial effect of 
presence on reducing stress and enhancing mood. It would be of high interest to study presence 
also in the context of computer games as it is of high interest in the gaming community and has 
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been shown to be one of the driving factors for playing computer games (Yee, Ducheneaut, & 
Nelson, 2012). Jennett et al. (2008, p.  644) even describe it as being “key to a good gaming 
experience”. As Reinecke (2009a; 2009b) pointed out, immersive experiences  in games (i.e. 
presence) are also crucial for the recovery experience. However, empirical findings for this claim 
are sparse and none of the reported studies explicitly measured presence. Thus, in our 
experiment, we used an explicit measure of presence and linked it to mood repair following a 
phase of computer gaming. To induce increased variability in presence and to look at differences 
between the immersion of conditions, we manipulated the mode of presentation of the gaming 
activity, including a VR condition. We are the first to include a VR condition in the context of 
gaming and mood improvement. Again, the available literature is mainly based on research on 
VR therapy and stress reduction in relaxing virtual environments (VEs). Although, results of 
these studies show a clear effect of presence in VEs on stress reduction and mood enhancement, 
it is not clear whether computer games would elicit the same effect (e.g. Annerstedt et al., 2013; 
Freeman, Lessiter, Keogh, Bond, & Chapman, 2004; Liszio, Graf, & Masuch, 2018; Valtchanov 
& Ellard, 2010; Villani & Riva, 2012; Villani, Riva, & Riva, 2007; Villani, Luchetta, Preziosa, 
& Riva, 2009; for an overview see Villani, Cipresso, Gaggioli, & Riva, 2016). 
Thus, the aims of the present study were 1) to link presence with mood repair following a 
gaming experience, 2) to differentiate between the effect of individual experienced presence and 
the effect of immersion as a property of the system, and 3) to add a VR gaming condition. For 
this purpose, 77 participants underwent a stress-induction to create a need for mood repair. 
Afterwards, they were assigned to one of three immersion conditions in which they either played 
a computer game in VR using a Head-mounted display (HMD), played the same game on a 
desktop computer, or – in a control condition – watched a recording of the same game. To assess 
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mood repair after the respective experience, we assessed mood ratings before gaming (after the 
stress-induction, respectively) and after gaming and compared both measures. The individual 
level of presence was assessed with a questionnaire. We also included a measure of enjoyment 
since enjoyment was shown to be related to recovery or need satisfaction and involvement 
(Reinecke et al., 2011; Tamborini et al., 2010; 2011). Additionally, Wirth et al. (2007) proposed 
that presence acts as a booster of media effects such as enjoyment. Thus, we explored 
relationships between enjoyment, individual presence and mood repair. 
In accordance with the literature review above, we stated the following hypotheses: 
(1) The higher the immersion of the gaming activity, the stronger the effect of mood 
repair. 
(2) The higher the level of individual presence, the stronger the effect of mood repair. 
(3) Enjoyment is positively related to (a) mood repair and (b) presence. 
Insights into these issues could help us to better understand the potential of computer 
games as a means for mood repair and the role of presence. 
2. Method 
2.1 Participants 
77 participants (24 male and 53 female) took part in the experiment. We excluded five 
participants because they guessed the hypotheses (see section 2.5 for details). The average age 
was 23.1 years (SD = 5.7 years). Participants received either course credit or a little token of 
appreciation (chocolate bar) for their participation and were debriefed after the experiment. The 
study was approved by the ethics committee of the Human Sciences Faculty of the University of 




We used a mix of group comparisons and correlational analyses. On the one hand, we 
used groups to investigate influences on mood ratings in terms of immersion. On the other hand, 
we investigated the relationship between mood ratings and individual presence scores of 
participants across conditions. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups: VR, 
desktop, and video condition. The conditions varied in the level of immersion, with the VR 
condition having the highest immersion and the video condition having the lowest immersion. 
Using a meta-analysis, Cummings and Bailenson (2015) demonstrated that the level of 
immersive quality of a system leads to higher experienced presence, which especially applies to 
the level of user tracking and the use of stereoscopic visuals. Thus, the VR condition should 
evoke the highest presence levels. Additionally, two studies have shown that actively playing a 
game evoked more presence than watching a pre-recorded playing session (Kätsyri, Hari, 
Ravaja, & Nummenmaa, 2013; Wong, Rigby, & Brumby, 2017). Nevertheless, watching pre-
recorded video games can still lead to feelings of presence (Collins et al., 2019; Wong et al., 
2017), which means that all conditions should lead to at least some degree of presence and that 
the average level of presence should vary between conditions. 
The VR and desktop conditions involved playing the game Star Conflict, with (n = 31) 
and without the addition of an HMD (n = 29). The video condition required participants to watch 
a recording of the same game (n = 17). See section 2.3 below for more information. We obtained 
different subsample sizes because the video condition was later added as a control condition. 
However, unequal group size is not a requirement for simple group comparisons (i.e. non-
factorial designs; cf. Miliken & Johnson, 1984). The possible loss of statistical power implies a 
conservative testing of the hypotheses. For correlational analyses, we weighted data points 
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according to the size of the group (cf. Meinck & Rodriguez, 2013) or included the condition as a 
factorial variable. 
The measured variables were feelings of presence while playing, ratings of momentary 
mood (positive and negative), and enjoyment. Before being randomly assigned to a condition, 
participants had to undergo a stress-induction procedure. Differences between mood ratings 
before and after the procedure served as a check whether the stress-induction worked as 
expected. In order to assess mood repair, differences in positive and negative mood ratings 
between after the gaming activity and after the stress-induction were computed. Mood repair was 
defined as a change of mood ratings in the desired direction (positive values indicating an 
increase in positive mood and a decrease in negative mood). A summary of the experimental 
design is shown in Figure 1. 
2.3 Material 
2.3.1 Stimulus material. We used the game Star Conflict (Star Gem Inc., 2015; Figure 2). 
Star Conflict is a “fast-paced, third person space shooter, allowing players to sit at the helm of a 
starship and take part in high-octane skirmishes for control of ancient alien artefacts” (Star 
Conflict Wiki, 2015). The game involves elements of strategy and action. Five subjects that were 
tested in a pilot test prior to the actual experiment described the game as non-violent and fun to 
play. Whereas the original game is a multiplayer online game, in this study only the initial 
tutorials of the game were used, where participants learned to control the ship and how to take 
over an enemy base. We chose the game because full technical support for playing in VR was 
given and it was freely available. Furthermore, the game is described as highly immersive by 
players in online forums (Oculus VR, 2015). Additionally, the genre of the game is suitable for 
detecting effects on mood enhancement: Collins and Cox (2014) showed that first person 
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shooters and action games were most highly correlated with recovery experiences, whereas the 
recovery potential of sports games turned out to be lower. 
For the desktop and the video condition, we used a commonly available gaming notebook 
with a 15.6-inch LED screen (resolution: 1920 x 1080 pixels). In the VR condition, participants 
played with the Oculus Rift DK 2 (Oculus VR, 2014). Both active playing groups used an Xbox 
360 controller (Microsoft Corporation, 2005) as input device. 
2.3.2 Stress-induction. Two stress-induction procedures suggested by Bauer, Pripfl, 
Lamm, Prainsack and Taylor (2003) and McLaughlin, Lefaivre and Cummings (2009) were 
combined. The resulting procedure comprised an anagram task and a number series task, each 
consisting of five items. Participants had to find solutions within a given time period of ten 
minutes. All items were unsolvable or almost unsolvable, except for one item in each task, which 
was included for plausibility. Participants were motivated to perform well by putting a chocolate 
bar in front of them. They were informed that they would receive the bar depending on the score 
in the test. They were told that most participants usually achieved the required score (cf. Henna, 
Zilberman, Gentil, & Gorenstein, 2008). After returning the response sheet, participants were 
told that they did not score high enough for receiving the chocolate bar. 
2.4 Measurement Instruments 
2.4.1 Mood repair. Momentary mood was assessed using the Positive and Negative 
Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Mood repair was then computed 
as the difference between the post-game mood ratings and the pre-game mood ratings (t3 – t2). 
We refer to decreases in negative mood as mood repair in negative emotions and to increases in 
positive mood as mood repair in positive emotions. The PANAS is one of the most used 
measures to assess current mood and emotions (Watson & Vaidya, 2003). Previous studies 
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suggest that it is a useful measure to assess sudden changes in mood (e.g. Russell & Newton, 
2008). Participants in our study gave ratings on an analog scale (measured in cm with a range of 
0 to 13 cm) for ten positive and ten negative adjectives (e.g. alert or determined as positive and 
upset and ashamed as negative adjectives). In our study, the reliability of the scales was 
Cronbach’s α = .86 for positive and Cronbach’s α = .84 for negative emotions. 
2.4.2 Presence. Feelings of presence were obtained by the Pictorial Presence SAM 
questionnaire (Weibel, Schmutz, Pahud, & Wissmath, 2015). The SAM questionnaire – which 
was inspired by the widely used Self-Assessment Manikin to measure emotion (Lang, 1980) – 
was recently developed to assess presence intuitively and unambiguously. It has been shown to 
be a valid and sensitive measure for assessing spatial presence (Weibel et al., 2015). For six 
items representing the sensation of presence, participants choose one of five graphical 
representations that best matches their sensations. In the present study, the SAM questionnaire 
showed a sufficient reliability with Cronbach’s α = .67. 
2.4.3 Enjoyment. In line with various other studies (Green, Brock, & Kaufman, 2004; 
Knobloch & Zillmann, 2002; Weibel et al., 2011; Weibel, Wissmath, & Stricker, 2011c) we 
measured enjoyment with one single item: “On a scale from one to ten, how much fun have you 
had?” (1 = no fun at all; 10 = a lot of fun). 
2.5 Procedure 
In order to assure the feasibility of the procedure, participants were told that the study 
served the purpose to relate their ability to solve a rule-based cognitive task with their ratings of 
presence in a gaming task. Furthermore, they were told that the ratings of current emotions 
would serve as a control variable. 
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The procedure of the experiment is summarized in Figure 1. First, participants filled out 
the PANAS. Then they were introduced to the anagram and the number series task. They had ten 
minutes to complete the tasks. After explaining the results of the test, participants filled out the 
PANAS again in order to test whether the stress-induction was successful. Next, participants 
were randomly assigned to one of the three experimental conditions. First, the handling of the 
controller was explained. Furthermore, in the VR condition, they were instructed on how to use 
the HMD and were told to immediately report any feelings of nausea. Participants were asked to 
freely play the game or watch the recording. The duration of this phase was 30 minutes in each 
condition. Afterwards, participants filled out the PANAS a third time in order to test whether 
playing the computer game led to mood repair. Finally, participants filled out the presence scale 
and answered the enjoyment question, followed by a demographic questionnaire. We carefully 
interviewed each participant after the experiment to make sure we did not include participants 
who guessed the hypotheses. Only five participants reported that they drew a link between the 
gaming task and the mood questionnaires and were therefore excluded. Upon completion of the 
experiment, the participants were debriefed. 
3. Results 
3.1 Strategy of Analyses 
We used two different approaches to test our hypotheses: In an experimental approach, 
we compared the three experimental conditions in terms of positive and negative mood repair, 
presence, and enjoyment, using one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) or Kruskal-Wallis 
tests. In a correlational approach, we calculated measures of association between individual 
levels of presence, enjoyment, and mood repair. Group-size-weighted bivariate correlations with 
Pearson coefficients were used. Additionally, we calculated a moderated regression model to 
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differentiate the effect of individual presence on mood repair from the group-level effect of 
presence. This is important because of the hierarchical structure of the data: Individual presence 
and mood repair are nested in the three conditions and, thus, the overall level of presence and 
mood repair could vary between groups (contextual effect). Therefore, analyzing the effect of 
presence only on the individual level would potentially result in a Simpson's paradox (cf. 
Ameringer, Serlin, & Ward, 2009). We also report an exploratory mediated regression model to 
test whether enjoyment serves as a mediator variable between presence and mood repair. Since 
mood repair in positive and negative emotions were both left skewed, we performed a log-
transformation with an added constant on both variables. This way we obtained normally 
distributed residuals for the correlational analyses. 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
A summary of descriptive statistics for the whole sample is presented in Table 1. All but 
six participants had never used an HMD before. Additionally, the average time participants 
spend playing computer games in a week was 66 minutes (SD = 164 minutes). 
3.3 Manipulation Checks 
To examine the stress-induction procedure, we analyzed differences in the PANAS 
ratings before and after the stress-induction (t2 – t1). As expected, the mean value for positive 
emotions after the stress-induction (M = 6.41, SD = 2.37) was lower than the baseline mean 
value assessed before the stress-induction (M = 7.42, SD = 1.85). This indicates that the stress-
induction for positive emotions was successful, t(76) = -6.81, p < .001, d = -0.78. Similarly, 
ratings for negative emotions were higher after the stress-induction (M = 2.70, SD = 2.08) than 
before the stress-induction (M = 1.57, SD = 1.33), z = 2652, p < .001, d = 0.67 (a Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test was used because residuals were not normally distributed). 
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A one-way Kruskal-Wallis test was used to assess differences in presence scores between 
conditions for the SAM questionnaire because residuals were not normally distributed. This 
served as a check whether the manipulation of designated immersion worked as intended. The 
test revealed a significant effect, χ2(2) = 19.0, p < .001, ε2 = 0.25. Post hoc comparisons (Dwass-
Steel-Critchlow-Fligner) showed that presence scores were lower in the video condition 
compared to the desktop and VR conditions (both p < .01). Descriptively, there was a linear 
trend, which suggests that the higher the intended immersion of the condition, the more presence 
was reported by participants. This is in accordance with our expectations. Presence scores for 
each condition are shown in Figure 3. 
A one-way ANOVA revealed also a significant difference between conditions in 
enjoyment, F(2, 74) = 12.2, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.25. Post-hoc comparisons (Tukey) indicated that 
the video condition involved lower enjoyment compared to the other conditions (both p < .001). 
Enjoyment scores for each condition are shown in Figure 4. 
3.4 Testing the Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1. The higher the immersion of the gaming activity, the stronger the effect of 
mood repair. 
We looked at mood ratings to test the first hypothesis. Overall, there was a change in 
emotional ratings from before gaming to afterwards across conditions for positive, t(76) = 3.82, p 
< .001, d = 0.44, and negative emotions, t(76) = -6.90, p < .001, d = -0.79 (see table 1 for 
descriptive statistics). This means that overall, a significant effect of mood repair in positive and 
negative emotions could be observed. In line with the first hypothesis, the strength of mood 
repair depends on immersion: There was a significant difference in the change of positive 
emotions between conditions, F(2, 74) = 5.18, p = .008, ηp
2 = 0.12 (see figure 5). A planned 
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contrast revealed that the video condition differed from the other conditions, p = .002. Successful 
mood repair in positive emotions could only be observed in conditions involving active gaming 
(see descriptive statistics in figure 5: There was a decrease in positive emotions for the video 
condition). There was, however, no differential effect for mood repair in negative emotions 
between conditions, F(2, 74) = 0.21, p = .811, ηp
2 = 0.01 (see figure 5). This means that the 
strength of mood repair was affected by the condition only in positive emotions, which partially 
supports the first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2. The higher the level of individual presence, the stronger the effect of mood 
repair. 
Weighted bivariate correlations were computed using the weights package in R (Pasek, 
2018; R Core Team, 2019). The results show that individual presence is related to mood repair in 
positive emotions but not in negative emotions (see Table 2 for an overview). This means that a 
higher individual presence rating was associated with stronger mood repair in positive emotions. 
This partially supports our second hypothesis stating that individual presence levels enhance 
mood repair. 
To control for a potential Simpson's paradox, we calculated moderated regression models 
with presence as a linear predictor and immersion as a factorial predictor. The dependent 
variables were mood repair in positive and negative emotions. The results for positive emotions 
are shown in Table 3. The model for negative emotions yielded no significant prediction of mood 
repair (R2 = .08, F(5, 70) = 1.14, p = 0.346). A simple slope analysis revealed that presence 
predicted mood repair in positive emotions only in the VR condition (bVR = 0.15, p = 0.002; other 
slopes both p > 0.05; see Figure 6). Therefore, the positive effect of individual presence on mood 
repair in positive emotions was limited to the VR condition. 
 149 
Hypothesis 3. Enjoyment is positively related to (a) mood repair and (b) presence. 
Enjoyment was positively associated with mood repair in positive emotions but not 
negative emotions (see Table 2). Enjoyment was also positively associated with presence. Thus, 
hypothesis 3a was partially and hypothesis 3b fully supported. 
To further investigate the relationship between the variables presence, enjoyment and 
mood repair in positive emotions, we tested an explorative mediation model using the jAMM 
module in jamovi (Gallucci, 2019; The jamovi project, 2019). We tested whether enjoyment 
mediates the relationship between individual presence and mood repair in positive emotions. To 
again control for possible contextual effects, the immersion of the condition was entered as an 
additional explanatory variable (all possible moderation effects of immersion were non-
significant and were therefore not included in the final model). An overview is provided in 
Figure 7. The results show that the relationship between presence and mood repair in positive 
emotions is mediated by enjoyment. The unstandardized regression coefficients between 
presence and enjoyment and between enjoyment and mood repair in positive emotions were 
statistically significant. The indirect effect was tested using bootstrapping procedures (1000 
samples) as proposed by Hayes (2017). The unstandardized indirect effect of presence on mood 
repair in positive emotions was significant, B = .29, SE = .14, 95% CI = .07, .62. There was, 
however, no total and no direct effect of presence on mood repair in positive emotions (both p > 
.05). These results are consistent with indirect-only mediation (Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010). The 
indirect effects of the immersion conditions on mood repair in positive emotions were not 
significant (both p > .05). 
4. Discussion 
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We investigated whether immersive gaming conditions led to improved mood repair after 
a stress-induction and whether the individual level of presence was associated with better mood 
repair. High immersion was operationalized with a VR gaming condition, medium immersion 
with a desktop gaming condition, and low immersion with a passive video condition. Supporting 
our expectation, the level of presence varied between the conditions, with the VR condition 
evoking the highest levels and the video condition evoking significantly lower levels than the 
two active gaming conditions. The active gaming conditions were also evoking higher levels of 
enjoyment and stronger mood repair in positive emotions. This supports the idea that immersion 
in video games improves the overall state of mood after episodes of stress. However, whereas 
negative emotions generally decreased after the gaming activity, the immersion of the condition 
and the individual level of presence did not affect mood repair in negative emotions. 
Furthermore, using a moderation analysis, we could show that the individual level of presence 
was a significant predictor for mood repair in positive emotions, after controlling for immersion. 
However, presence only led to significantly improved mood repair in the VR condition. Finally, 
using an exploratory mediation analysis, we showed that only the individual level of presence led 
to improved mood repair in positive emotions by evoking higher levels of enjoyment (indirect-
only mediation). Immersion was also associated with higher enjoyment but showed no indirect 
effect on mood repair. 
The main result of our study is that individual presence levels are favorable for attaining 
an overall improved mood state. This provides empirical support for the claim that presence 
experiences in gaming enhance well-being and mood (Collins & Cox, 2014; Reinecke, 2009a; 
2009b; Reinecke et al., 2011). Previous research has linked effects of mood enhancement to the 
extent of experienced presence in relaxing VR environments (e.g. Freeman et al., 2004; Villani et 
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al., 2007; Villani et al., 2009). Our results suggest that presence contributes to mood repair not 
only in immersive environments designed to be relaxing, but also in games. We could show that 
presence was associated with mood repair in positive emotions. There seemed to be a weak 
association with mood repair in negative emotions, but this finding did not reach statistical 
significance. After controlling for immersion, we could demonstrate that individual presence 
affects mood repair in positive emotions independent of the differences between the conditions. 
However, this effect was limited to the VR condition. In the desktop condition, there was a small 
but non-significant effect, and in the video condition, the effect was negative but also non-
significant. A possible explanation for these results is that presence plays a more important role 
in an immersive virtual world. This means that gaming itself is crucial for improved mood and 
that presence only enhances mood in VR gaming. Potentially, presence is only beneficial for 
mood repair if it is relevant for the respective medium: A simple yet non-immersive game can 
still evoke strong enjoyment in players, whereas a game like Star Conflict relies on immersive 
gameplay features to involve the user in the game narrative, which then leads to enjoyment. The 
immersive elements are even more important if the world is supposed to appear convincingly 
realistic as in a VR condition. A floor effect in the video condition could serve as an alternative 
explanation: the video condition was not able to lead to large enough presence and enjoyment 
scores to improve mood. Indeed, there were no high presence scores for the video condition (the 
highest score was 3.80). Additionally, very high scores (> 4.5) were mainly observed in the VR 
condition. Thus, it is possible that presence scores were not high enough in the desktop condition 
to evoke an individually increasing effect on mood repair, whereas the VR condition provided 
participants with the opportunity to experience large increased presence scores, leading to highly 
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improved mood. There are also other possible explanations and additional studies using VR 
gaming are needed to confirm our results. 
Apart from the effect of presence on mood repair, our results also confirm previous 
findings: A gaming activity led to an overall improved mood state after a stress-induction (cf. 
Collins & Cox, 2014; Reinecke 2009a; 2009b). The size for this effect was small to medium in 
positive emotions (0.44) and large in negative emotions (-0.79; Cohen, 1988). As in previous 
studies, active gaming led to an overall improved mood state compared to watching a video 
(Chen & Raney, 2009; Collins et al., 2019; Reinecke et al., 2011; Rieger et al., 2015). Thus, 
positive mood only increased in the gaming conditions. There was no difference between the VR 
and the desktop condition, which means that VR as a medium might not be overall better at 
improving mood than desktop gaming, despite offering a higher potential for strong presence 
experiences. It is possible that the interactivity of active playing led to already strong mood 
repair in the gaming conditions and that the VR condition was simply not offering an additional 
benefit in our study. After all, Star Conflict is described as fun to play in online forums (Oculus 
VR, 2015). This assumption could be tested in future studies by comparing VR and desktop 
conditions using games with different potentials for mood improvement. 
In contrast to the active gaming conditions, positive mood showed a small decrease in the 
video condition. Generally, this is in line with our expectations but could indicate that watching a 
pre-recorded gaming session does not provide a boost in positive emotions. This is an important 
finding because watching others playing games on YouTube, Twitch.tv, or at e-sports 
tournaments is increasingly popular among gamers (Gandolfi, 2016; Smith, Obrist, & Wright, 
2013). Studies suggested that watching such videos involves experiences of presence (Collins et 
al., 2019; Wong et al., 2017). In a previous study by Chen and Raney (2009), the increase in 
 153 
positive mood was higher in an interactive condition but was also positive in a non-interactive 
condition and a control condition. Rieger et al. (2015) found a similar increase of positive 
emotions in all interactivity conditions. In contrast to positive emotions, negative emotions in our 
experiment decreased in each condition to about the same amount, indicating no advantage of 
active gaming and VR technology. Interestingly, previous studies (Chen & Raney, 2009; Rieger 
et al., 2015) found that negative emotions did not decrease in a non-interactive condition but 
only in an interactive condition. Thus, the video condition in our experiment showed a surprising 
decrease in negative emotions but also a decrease in positive emotions. A reason for this could 
be the different choice of games. Star Conflict probably involves more action and strategy than 
games used in previous studies, which could enhance the potential for increasing positive 
emotions. Another reason could lie in different measurements of mood repair: Rieger et al. 
(2015), for example, operationalized positive and negative mood with measures for happy and 
depressed mood. In contrast, the PANAS questionnaire, which was used in our study, is targeted 
at more general mood states, including items such as attentive and nervous. However, the video 
condition in our experiment evoked also less presence and enjoyment scores than the active 
gaming conditions. This is in line with anecdotal reports of participants. It is plausible, therefore, 
that the low overall enjoyment of the video led to the unimproved positive mood. Additionally, 
there was arguably a lack of competition in the video condition. According to Reinecke (2009a; 
2009b), successful recovery demands for a task structure that enables competence and mastery 
experiences. The same could be true for mood repair. As for negative mood, it is possible that 
negative emotions decreased naturally over time. We cannot separate the effect of time from the 
overall effect of the gaming activity since there was no non-medium control condition. Thus, 
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further studies should investigate the specific advantage of watching others play by contrasting it 
with a non-medium control condition. 
Another important point is that we found no meaningful associations involving mood 
repair in negative emotions. Interestingly, the two measures of mood repair showed no 
substantial correlation. Negative emotions could, therefore, activate other processes than positive 
emotions. It is possible that gaming is especially helpful for restoring positive affect but not as 
effective as previously thought in reducing negative affect. Interestingly, recent findings from 
organizational psychology provide evidence that recovery from work-related stress goes beyond 
the replenishing of depleted resources and involves preemptively building up resources to 
increase coping capabilities and to avoid future loss of resources (Conservation of Resources 
Theory; Hobfoll, 1989; cf. Reinecke & Eden, 2016). Thus, preemptively building up a positive 
mood state by increasing positive emotions could be more functionally relevant for gamers and 
more easily achievable than eliminating negative emotions. It is worth noting, however, that 
previous studies did find a beneficial effect of gaming for negative emotions. Context (i.e. the 
type of game and the method for inducing a negative mood state) could play an important role. 
This discrepancy should be addressed in further research by specifically comparing the effects of 
positive and negative mood repair and by varying the type of computer game and other variables 
such as the length of media exposure. 
Lastly, we showed that enjoyment mediated the effect of presence on mood repair in 
positive emotions. This supports our expectation that presence is beneficial for mood repair 
because it leads to a higher enjoyment of a game. Wirth et al. (2007) suppose that increased 
presence in entertaining media leads to increased enjoyment of the media's content. Accordingly, 
Teng (2010) proposes that immersion in games is pleasurable and satisfies the user’s need. In 
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accordance with this assumption, Weibel and Wissmath (2011) were able to show for various 
computer games that presence has a positive influence on enjoyment. Reinecke and coworkers 
(2011) noted that enjoyment could be an important amplifier for the recovery effect. Enjoyment 
was also related to involvement in their study. Our results support these conclusions. Presence 
was highly correlated with enjoyment and higher enjoyment led to increased mood repair in 
positive emotions. However, our results should be considered exploratory and further studies are 
needed to confirm this relationship. 
Our results clearly demonstrate positive effects of gaming. However, it is important to 
note that this might not always be the case and that there could also be negative effects. Bowman 
and Tamborini (2012; 2015), for example, showed that high task demand – as opposed to 
medium demand – led to less mood repair. We did not measure task demand, but it is likely that 
task demand was medium and not high in our study: the control of the ship in Star Conflict is 
comparatively complex, but participants only played a beginner's tutorial. Consequentially, all 
participants managed to complete the tutorial successfully. However, if the demand of a game is 
too high, effects of mood repair could be severely impaired (Bowman & Tamborini, 2012; 
2015). Furthermore, a recent experience sampling study found that more than half of the studied 
media occurrences (including gaming) showed at least some degree of conflict with other goals 
and responsibilities (Reinecke & Hofmann, 2016). This goal conflict as well as the evaluation of 
one’s own media use as a form of procrastination can result in feelings of guilt that reduce 
enjoyment and impair situational well-being (Reinecke, Hartmann, & Eden, 2014; Reinecke & 
Hofmann, 2016). Reinecke and Eden (2016) propose that prolonged media exposure may turn 
media use from a resource-providing into a resource-consuming activity. Thus, prolonged 
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gaming could lead to impaired mood, even when short-term effects are positive. Successful 
media-induced recovery and mood repair seem to depend on the right dosage. 
In conclusion, our results show that gaming improves mood. Furthermore, the individual 
level of presence enhances the effect of mood repair in VR and presence is also strongly related 
to media enjoyment. Our results show that the presence experience in a game affects mood repair 
beyond the effect of the game’s immersion and that only presence might influence positive 
emotions by evoking higher enjoyment. The individual level of presence is especially important 
for VR games as they may potentially offer greater opportunities for experiencing high levels of 
presence. Presence experiences effectively enhance mood states and build up resources. This has 
implications for the VR gaming industry as well as health research. The positive effect of 
presence in VR could be used for the treatment of stress and negative affect. In addition to 
relaxing environments, games offer challenges and competition and are a form of treatment that 
can draw from thousands of readily available experiences. Additionally, immersive experiences 
in games are beneficial for mood repair and show that the immersion of a game combine with the 
individual's reaction towards the game to promote psychological well-being and recovery from 
stress and negative mood states.  
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Descriptive statistics for variables across all conditions. 
Notes: N = 76 for Pictorial Presence SAM and 77 for all other variables.  
Variable min max M SD 
Enjoyment 









Mood repair in positive emotions -2.21 7.46 0.80 1.84 
Mood repair in negative emotions -1.18 9.10 1.27 1.61 
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Table 2. 
Bivariate weighted correlations between variables (across conditions). 
Notes: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (one-tailed). All p-values were adjusted using the 
Bonferroni method. Mood repair in positive and negative emotions was log-transformed to 
obtain normally distributed residuals. N = 76 for Pictorial Presence SAM and 77 for all other 
variables. 
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1. Mood repair in positive emotions 
2. Mood repair in negative emotions 




















Mood repair in positive emotions predicted by presence (focal predictor) and immersion 
(moderator). 
Notes: R2 = 0.27, F(5, 70) = 5.18, p < .001. The video condition was used as the reference group 
(dummy coding). Presence was centered. Mood repair in positive emotions was log-transformed 
in order to obtain normally distributed residuals.  
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Figure 2. Screenshot from Star Conflict  
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Figure 3. Mean presence SAM scores for each condition. Error bars represent standard errors. 




Figure 4. Mean enjoyment scores for each condition. Error bars represent standard errors. 




Figure 5. Mood repair in positive and negative emotions in each condition. In terms of positive 
emotions, stronger mood repair was found for the two gaming conditions compared to the 
video condition. Note that decreases in negative emotions (i.e. change in the desired 
direction) are shown as positive values to facilitate interpretation. Error bars represent 
standard errors  
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Figure 6. Simple slope analysis for the effect of presence on mood repair in positive emotions. 
Only the simple slope in the VR condition was significant (p = .002)  
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Figure 7. Unstandardized regression coefficients for the relationship between presence and mood 
repair in positive emotions as mediated by enjoyment. Immersion was entered as an 
explanatory variable to control for contextual effects. This categorical independent variable 
is shown with only one rectangle, but its effects are estimated using contrast variables 
(dummy coding with the video condition as reference category). Presence was centered. 
Covariances among independent variables are estimated but not shown. The total effect 
between presence and mood repair is in parentheses. Bias-corrected bootstrapping (1000 
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1 Introduction 
Opticians do not only measure visual acuity but also the visual field, stereoscopic vision, and 
color vision. In the same vein, presence researchers should not only measure attentional 
allocation to the virtual environment (VE) but also the perceived realism of the VE. Perceived 
realism is a perceptual and cognitive evaluation of the virtual world. When in VR, a user will 
typically compare the look of virtual objects to real world objects and judge the level of 
congruence. Similarly, a story and its characters are also evaluated in terms of consistency and 
plausibility. With widespread use of immersive VR technology, it has become an easy task to 
absorb users in a VE and thus judgments about the realism of the VE become more important. 
Interestingly, perceived realism is not part of the most widely used presence definitions or is 
blended in with the term being there, respectively. Being there is strongly associated with 
attentional allocation and dominates current presence definitions. Mental absorption and 
perceived realism are both important aspects of presence and need to be combined in order to 
obtain an adequate assessment of presence in VR. Thus, theories and measures of presence need 
to be extended and establish perceived realism as an important domain besides being there. 
2 Presence in VR: Being There and Perceived Realism as Two Crucial Dimensions 
Presence is defined as the sense of being in a computer-mediated environment (Draper et al., 
1998; Steuer, 1992) or being in a computer-generated world such as in VR (Sheridan, 1992; 
Slater & Wilbur, 1997). Presence is a shortened term for telepresence and was first introduced by 
Minsky (1980). According to Steuer (1992), presence is the extent to which one’s attention is 
allocated to the mediated environment rather than to the immediate physical environment. Thus, 
commonly, the expression being there was used to describe presence (Sheridan, 1992; Steuer, 
1992; Witmer & Singer, 1998; see Skarbez et al., 2017). Lombard and Ditton (1997) use the term 
illusion of non-mediation. This illusion occurs when a person does no longer perceive the 
mediated environment as being displayed by a media device. A similar concept was proposed by 
Wirth et al. (2007), according to which presence occurs when attention is allocated to the 
mediated environment being the user’s primary egocentric frame of reference (PERF). Slater 
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(2003, 2009) conceives presence as the result of a Place Illusion (PI) and a Plausibility Illusion 
(Psi). The PI is the result of sensorimotor contingencies (actions in the VE correspond naturally 
with perception). It relies on technical preconditions. PI also refers to a “sense of being there” 
(Slater, 2009, p. 3551). In contrast, Psi is based on story-based interactivity and the credibility of 
characters. 
To our knowledge, three studies were carried out to gather insights into the dimensionality of 
presence (Lessiter et al., 2001; Schubert et al., 2001; Witmer et al., 2005). Factor analyses 
yielded either an involvement or an engagement factor (Skarbez et al., 2017, p. 24). Both terms 
are connected to attention and the sensation of being there. The sensation of being there depends 
on the amount of attentional resources allocated to the virtual world rather than to internal 
thoughts or other non-visible external sources. If one feels present at a certain place, it means 
that one's thoughts are concerned with this place rather than another place or the medium itself. 
Thus, in line with Wirth et al. (2007), the mediated world constitutes the primary frame of 
reference. The prevalence of attention is also reflected in numerous concepts such as involvement 
("focusing one’s energy and attention on a coherent set of stimuli"; Witmer & Singer, 1998, p. 
227), engagement or engrossment ("the amount of time, effort and attention required from the 
gamer increases for more immersive experiences"; Brown & Cairns, 2004, p. 1299), perceptual 
immersion ("blocking as many of the senses as possible to the outside world and making it 
possible for the user to perceive only the artificial world"; McMahan, 2003, p. 77), or absorption 
("the ability to get lost in the task at hand"; Baños et al., 1999, p. 144). We argue that this shift of 
attentional focus is the main concept that underlies the sense of being there. Accordingly, we 
define being there in this article as the allocation of attentional resources to the mediated world 
and the sensation of perceptually being surrounded by the VE. 
Thus, presence is commonly associated with increased attention towards the VE and decreased 
attention towards external factors and the medium itself. However, presence in this sense could 
also be achieved by other activities requiring our attention such as focusing on the street while 
driving a car – clearly not a task where one would use the term presence. In this article, we focus 
on presence in VEs. VEs create a virtual world that is supposed to be realistic, credible, and 
believable. Absorbing the user is easily achieved by blocking external auditory and visual 
sensory input by means of head-mounted displays (HMDs). However, having a sense of being 
there does not necessarily imply a high level of perceived realism and, thus, a high level of 
presence. For example, a non-realistic world filled with simple geometrical shapes can elicit the 
feeling of being there, simply because this is the only environment providing sensory 
stimulation. Even though the attentional focus is directed to the VE in this case, one does 
arguably not perceive it as highly realistic or believable. Therefore, perceived realism is the 
important dimension that is needed for a more complete understanding of presence. Perceived 
realism is not a mere function of the technical properties of the VR system but rather results from 
the interaction between individual expectations and the properties of the VE such as tracking 
quality and visual appearance of objects. Users typically compare the look of virtual objects to 
real world objects and judge the level of congruence. This results in a judgment about the 
credibility of the VE. Narrative elements and characters are also evaluated in terms of 
consistency and plausibility (cf. suspension-of-disbelief). Judgments about credibility and 
plausibility are likely to depend on individual differences between users (cf. immersive 
tendency). Empirical findings support this idea, as they show that presence is modulated by 
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individual expectations, personal relevance, and personality traits (Bucolo, 2004; Weibel et al., 
2010; 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). 
Perceived realism shares similarities with Slater’s concept of Psi (2003; 2009). Psi is the extent 
to which one experiences the illusion of something happening as "really happening" (Slater, 
2009, p. 3553). Psi occurs if there is a correlation between the user's actions and corresponding 
events in the VE. In contrast to Psi, perceived realism is a conscious judgment, not just a 
perceptual illusion. We do not regard it as a rapid and automatic response but rather as a 
conclusive judgment about the credibility and realness of the VE. Another difference is that users 
also take into account the visual quality of the VE. In Slater's (2009) terminology this would be 
referred to as PI – the illusion of being there. PI is binary (one is there or not) and modality-
specific (users can have full visual PI even when there is no auditory PI, or vice versa). However, 
in accordance with other presence theories, we define being there as an allocation of attentional 
resources. Therefore, users can allocate continuous amounts of attention to the VE and this is 
usually strongly correlated across perceptual modalities. 
Apart from Slater (2009), perceived realism was not an essential part of influential theories of 
presence. Although realism is often mentioned, it is usually only regarded as a beneficial factor 
for feeling absorbed. Unfortunately, perceived realism and attention are often mistakenly 
blended into the term being there. Lombard and Ditton (1997), for example, assume that an 
illusion of non-mediation is more likely to occur when perceived realism is high. The low 
priority of perceived realism can partly be attributed to the fact that the presence literature is 
largely based on research with early versions of HMDs with narrow field-of-views or non-VR 
media such as videos and desktop games. Presence in modern VR is different from presence 
experienced when exposed to traditional media. The user has no longer to close the gap between 
the physical place surrounding the computer screen and the environment that is displayed on the 
screen (cf. Slater & Wilbur, 1997). In three factor analyses mentioned above, either realness 
(Schubert et al., 2001), naturalness (Lessiter et al., 2001), or sensory fidelity (Witmer et al., 
2005) were part of the final factorial structure. This underlines the need to consider the perceived 
realism when conceptualizing presence. In many presence theories, some form of realism is 
mentioned but usually not addressed in detail (e.g. Lombard & Ditton, 1997, and Witmer & 
Singer, 1998). Realism is, however, part of separate conceptions such as fidelity (Alexander et 
al., 2005), reality judgment (Baños et al., 2000), stimulus fidelity (Stoffregen et al., 2003), 
coherence (Skarbez et al., 2017), and perceived realism (Busselle & Bilandzic, 2008). We think 
that these concepts complement the sense of being there and they need to be incorporated into a 
comprehensive definition of presence in VR. For this purpose, we suggest the term perceived 
realism and define it as the individual judgment about the degree of realism of the VE. 
There is no presence concept that explicitly distinguishes between being there as a form of 
attentional allocation and perceived realism. We claim that the focus on being there without 
separating attentional allocation and perceived realism is problematic for VR because the 
meaning of being there within VR is highly ambiguous. Unlike television, users are already there 
if equipped with a modern HMD: The entire visual field is taken in by the display, headphones 
are drowning external noise, and haptic devices emulate the sense of touch (cf. McMahan, 2003). 
Since VR devices effectively surround users with the virtual world, presence as the sense of 
being there is almost inevitably very high, even if VEs are poorly designed. There is almost no 
way of not being there.  There is no need of getting somewhere if one is already there. This 
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conceptual flaw manifests itself in questionnaires that are not properly adapted to modern VR 
and hinder a clear operationalization of presence, because they include confusing questions. For 
example, it is not clear how participants are supposed to respond to an item like "how much did 
the visual/auditory aspects of the environment involve you?" from the Presence Questionnaire 
(PQ; Witmer et al., 2005). In VR, there is no sensory information from the world other than the 
visual and auditory inputs. Yet other widely used questionnaires fail to differentiate between VR 
and other media experiences. The item "somehow I felt that the virtual world surrounded me" 
from the Igroup Presence Questionnaire (ITQ; Schubert et al., 2001) is another example. Being 
surrounded by the virtual world is literally inevitable. The Slater-Usoh-Steed Presence 
Questionnaire (SUS; Usoh et al., 2000; cf. Hein et al., 2018) uses the item, "during the time of 
the experience, which was strongest on the whole, your sense of being in the office space, or of 
being elsewhere?" For all items of this kind, it is difficult to give a conclusive answer because 
one is fully surrounded by the VE and elsewhere. In fact, many participants in VR studies report 
difficulties when filling out presence questionnaires. They often wonder whether they are 
expected to answer, “I totally agree” because a VE perceptually surrounded them or whether 
they are supposed to answer, “I totally disagree” because the VE was not realistic and they were 
at any moment in time aware of the office space surrounding them despite not seeing it. The 
ambiguity of questionnaire items instills different response strategies in presence questionnaires, 
which is highly undesirable for research. As Weibel et al. (2011c) claim, “almost every empirical 
study on presence includes subjective data in terms of questionnaires” (p. 866). Since this also 
applies to the studies conducted in VR, this is highly problematic. Presence – measured by 
questionnaire – is for example often used as a covariate in VR experiments, yet it is not clear 
whether the existing questionnaires in fact measure what is intended: Is it the allocated attention 
to the VE that is expected to affect the output variable or is it the judgment about the realism of 
the VE? Depending on the research context, it could be one of the dimensions or both. The 
interpretation of items could be markedly improved by separating between items measuring the 
sense of being there as an attentional focus on the one hand, and items measuring the perceived 
realism of the VE on the other hand. This would allow for a clearer operationalization of 
presence. Not including a separate measure for the perceived realism neglects important aspects 
of the virtual world and leads to a reduced range of possible responses and ambiguities in 
questionnaires.  
Presence in VR positively affects various output measures such as task performance and therapy 
outcome (e.g. Ragan et al., 2010; Riva et al., 2015). Thus, evoking presence is essential for VR 
development as well as for research. It is not surprising that presence has been identified as a 
design ideal for synthetic environments (e.g. Draper et al., 1998). Being there is undoubtedly an 
essential part of the presence experience. It is especially important for traditional media such as 
desktop games and movies where one's senses are not completely surrounded by the medium and 
one has to actively focus on the medium. In some cases, the feeling of being there might even be 
the main source of presence. In VR, however, where one quite literally enters an alternative 
physical reality, not much is needed to create a strong sense of being there and, thus, credible and 
convincing VEs play a much more important role in achieving strong feelings of presence. Thus, 
presence in VR is more than just being absorbed by a medium; it is depending on believable and 
credible virtual surroundings that constitute a completely different virtual world. In our view, the 
feeling of presence occurs if a mediated environment (1) captures and maintains our attention 
and (2) is perceived as realistic. Therefore, we suggest dividing presence into the two dimensions 
being there and perceived realism. This is illustrated in Figure 1. In essence, being there reflects 
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the academic view on presence, whereas perceived realism is crucial for VR developers as they 
typically focus on the physical realism of a VE like wide field-of-views, low-latency tracking, 
and high graphical quality but also on creating a plausible and compelling story (e.g. Abrash, 
2014: Bracken & Skalski, 2009; McGloin et al., 2013). The suggested two-dimensional concept 
of presence thus also combines the developers’ and researchers’ understanding of presence. 
3 Discussion 
Past research on presence either neglected perceived realism or did not separate perceived 
realism from being there. This resulted not only in contradictory definitions of presence but also 
in numerous confusing questionnaire items. Unlike other media, VR creates highly absorbing 
experiences and evoking a sense of being there is easily achieved by blocking external sensory 
input. Creating credible and realistic VEs is also important for achieving strong feelings of 
presence in VR. Enhancing the perceived realism of VEs is also a main focus of VR 
development. Yet, it is often neglected in theoretical conceptions or blended in with being there 
as a form of attentional allocation. Including questions about the perceived realism of a VE and 
separating them from questions asking about attentional allocation could reduce the confusion in 
presence questionnaires: Dividing presence into two dimensions will provide a clearer 
operationalization, which will make effects of presence on other measures better interpretable. 
This distinction closes the gap between developers’ main concerns about presence (perceived 
realism) and the researchers' focus on presence (being there). 
Attention is not enough: the virtual world needs to be believable, authentic, and visually 
appealing. This is especially true for professional VR applications that rely on maximal 
comparability to the real world, such as training environments for surgeons, firefighters, or 
pilots. A clearer separation of being there and perceived realism makes presence more 
generalizable across media and especially more applicable to VR. Medium-specific 
questionnaires could be developed. In terms of VR, questionnaires should focus on the perceived 
realism of the VE. This way, game designers could obtain subjective quality measures of their 
VEs. Researchers could use more detailed presence measures that separate being there and 
perceived realism. This will lead to stronger and clearer relationships between presence and 
output variables like enjoyment, therapy outcome, or learning. 
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